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President: Mr. Al-Nasser ..... (Qatar)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Agenda item 86

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/66/95)

Draft resolution (A/66/L.6)

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): I invite Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to introduce the report of the Agency for the year 2010.

Mr. Amano (International Atomic Energy Agency): Since 11 March, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working on the very serious accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. I will therefore begin by reflecting on that accident and its aftermath, before talking about other aspects of our work.

As the Assembly knows, the accident at Fukushima Daiichi was caused by an earthquake and a tsunami of unprecedented severity, which struck eastern Japan on 11 March. The IAEA has been doing everything it can to help Japan bring the situation at the site under control and to mitigate the consequences of the accident. The Japanese authorities and the operator have been working steadily to stabilize the reactors and are now confident that the so-called cold shutdown will be achieved by the end of the year. The IAEA will continue to assist Japan as it tackles the challenging work of decontamination and remediation in the affected areas.

In September, our 151 member States endorsed a 12-point IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Key elements of the Action Plan include an agreement that all countries with nuclear power programmes will promptly undertake what have become known as "stress tests" of their nuclear power plants. The framework for expert peer reviews by the IAEA of operational safety at nuclear power plants is being strengthened. The effectiveness of national and international emergency preparedness and response arrangements, IAEA safety standards and relevant international conventions will also be reviewed.

The Action Plan represents a significant step forward. It is vital that it be fully implemented in all countries with nuclear power and that the right lessons be learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

I would like to express my gratitude to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for having convened a high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security in September and bringing United Nations system organizations together to collaborate on this issue. Nuclear safety is the responsibility of individual countries, but the IAEA — the only international organization with expertise in all aspects of nuclear energy — will play the leading role in shaping a safer nuclear future throughout the world.

Despite the accident, the IAEA's latest projection is that the number of operating nuclear reactors in the world will continue to increase steadily in the coming

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decades, although less rapidly than was anticipated before the accident. Most of the growth will occur in countries that already have operating nuclear power plants, such as China and India. Many developing countries still plan to introduce nuclear power in the coming years. The factors contributing to encouraging interest in nuclear power have not changed. These factors include increasing global demand for energy, concerns about climate change, volatile fossil fuel prices and the security of energy supplies.

Nuclear security remains an extremely important issue for all States. In September, we marked the tenth anniversary of the 11 September 2011 terrorist attacks in the United States. In the wake of those attacks, the Agency significantly expanded its nuclear security programme to help countries protect nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities against malicious acts.

The number of States participating in our Illicit Trafficking Database programme continues to grow; it now stands at 113. In the year to June 2011, 172 incidents were reported to the Database. Fourteen involved activities such as unauthorized possession and/or attempts to sell or smuggle nuclear material or radioactive sources. Another 32 incidents involved the theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive material. Incidents of this nature demonstrate that security weaknesses continue to exist and must be addressed. I look forward to attending the second Nuclear Security Summit, to be hosted by the Republic of Korea in March.

I note once again that progress towards the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material remains slow, six years after its adoption. Adherence to the Amendment can significantly reduce the risk of nuclear material falling into the wrong hands. I encourage the parties to the Convention to work towards accelerating the entry into force of the Amendment.

In the area of nuclear applications, one major success story deserves special attention — the worldwide eradication of the deadly cattle disease rinderpest. Rinderpest is, in fact, the first animal disease ever to be eliminated, which is a momentous achievement and of enormous economic benefit to many developing countries. The net benefit to Africa alone is estimated at more than $1 billion per year. Together with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the African Union and other partners, the IAEA played an important part in eliminating this disease. Our role included making available affordable diagnostic techniques and training veterinary staff.

The same technologies used to eliminate rinderpest are now being successfully applied to diagnose and control other transboundary animal diseases. In Mongolia, for example, the Agency assisted in the successful control of a devastating outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease that threatened the entire livestock population of about 50 million animals.

The Agency has paid special attention this year to nuclear techniques related to water. That was the subject of our annual scientific forum in September, which was attended by leading scientists and Government officials. Nearly 1 billion people lack access to adequate drinking water. The Agency can help countries to undertake comprehensive assessments of water resources by making available unique information provided through the techniques of isotope hydrology. I will say more on this subject in a moment.

In September, we celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the opening of the IAEA Environment Laboratories in Monaco. The Laboratories have made an outstanding contribution to protecting our oceans and seas by developing advanced analytical methods and reference materials for assessing marine radioactivity and pollution.

The IAEA technical cooperation programme provides essential support to Member States in every region. Through the programme, Member States address national development priorities in fields where nuclear techniques offer advantages over other approaches or can usefully supplement them. New resources for the technical cooperation programme as a whole rose to $127.7 million in 2010, from $112.2 million in 2009. Nuclear safety was the largest area of activity overall, followed by human health, food and agriculture.

In September, the General Assembly held a High-Level Meeting on non-communicable diseases. IAEA human health projects and technical cooperation projects on water management and identification of pollution sources help countries to address non-communicable diseases, including cancer, diabetes and water-borne illnesses.

In the field of water, I would like to mention a very promising technical cooperation project in El Salvador, where the Agency has helped to establish a permanent monitoring system to provide early warnings of harmful algal blooms. If undetected, they can enter the food chain and cause serious, sometimes fatal, illness. El Salvador's fishing communities are benefiting directly from nuclear technologies that provide faster and more accurate warnings of algal blooms, and make it possible to close selected fishing grounds during danger periods.

In Kenya, a drip irrigation project, supported by the IAEA, has helped the Maasai people to grow more crops for both animal and human consumption. In addition to conserving precious water resources, the project has made it possible for more parents to afford schooling for their children.

Turning to nuclear verification, I am pleased to note that 112 countries have brought into force additional protocols to their safeguards agreements with the IAEA. That is very encouraging. The additional protocol is an essential tool for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurance not only that declared nuclear material is not being diverted from peaceful uses, but also that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in a country. I strongly hope that the remaining States will conclude additional protocols as soon as possible. I also ask the 14 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without safeguards agreements in force to implement them without delay.

I have continued to report regularly to our Board of Governors on the implementation of Agency safeguards in a number of countries. IAEA reports on the implementation of safeguards in Iran have been sent to the Security Council since 2006. In my recent reports, I stated that Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation to enable the Agency to conclude that all nuclear materials in Iran are used for peaceful activities. I urge Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of all relevant obligations in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

In the case of Syria, the Agency recently came to the conclusion that it is very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in 2007 was a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency. In June, the IAEA Board of Governors found Syria to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. It reported that non-compliance to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains a matter of serious concern. As may be known, the Agency has not been able to implement any safeguards measures in that country since April 2009. Last year's reports about the construction of a new uranium enrichment facility and a light-water reactor in that country are deeply troubling. I continue to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully implement all relevant resolutions of the IAEA General Conference and the Security Council.

Our efforts to improve the analytical capability and security of the Agency's safeguards laboratories have made excellent progress. The new extension to the Clean Laboratory for Safeguards, near Vienna, was completed on time and slightly under budget, and has been operational for several months. It greatly improves the Agency's ability to independently analyse environmental samples for safeguards.

In September 2000, the IAEA General Conference tasked the Director General with making arrangements to convene a forum, at which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of nuclear-weapon-free zones already established in other regions. My consultations with member States showed that conditions are now favourable for the holding of such a forum. I have therefore decided to convene the forum in Vienna on 21 and 22 November. It will consider the relevance to the Middle East of the experience of Africa, the South Pacific, South-East Asia, Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. I hope that it will be a successful meeting.

The President: I thank Mr. Amano for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the representative of Italy to introduce draft resolution A/66/L.6.

Mr. Ragaglini (Italy): First of all, I wish to thank Director General Amano for his report on the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2010 (see A/66/95) and to express my deep appreciation for his skilful leadership of the Agency. I

also pay tribute to the efforts of the Agency and its staff after the tragic disaster that struck Japan this past March, proving once again the centrality and fundamental importance of their work. Let me take this opportunity to renew my solidarity with the Japanese people for the suffering caused by the most devastating tsunami, as well as my admiration for their resilience.

I take the floor today to introduce, under agenda item 86, draft resolution A/66/L.6, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency", because Italy was elected Chair of the Agency's Board of Governors for the 2011-2012 period. Indeed, it is a great honour for my country. We look forward to working together with the States members of the Agency, the Director General and his staff in the coming months to further strengthen its fulfilment of its mandate.

Italy is firmly convinced that safety, security and nuclear safeguards are essential to ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy to protect the health of the population and the integrity of the environment. We advocate a strong international nuclear regime to guarantee that commitments and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are verified through the strict and independent monitoring of the Agency. We will continue our traditional commitment to the full range of its activities, bearing in mind the responsibilities incumbent upon the Chair of the Board of Governors.

The Fukushima Daiichi disaster has dramatically underlined the need to strengthen international cooperation on nuclear safety. We all know that the effects of a severe nuclear accident do not stop at national borders. Therefore, the ongoing improvement of nuclear safety must be a common goal for us all. There is a growing consensus worldwide towards the adoption of concrete measures to that end without further delay, and the Agency has a leading role to play in that endeavour.

We are therefore pleased with the General Conference's recent adoption of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. We are ready to consider new measures to strengthen the international nuclear safety regime, and call for universal adherence to all the international conventions adopted under the auspices of the Agency that are crucial to the international safety regime.

Reducing the risk of access to and malicious use of nuclear material by non-State actors is a shared goal of the international community. Italy is fully committed to the success of the process of strengthening national measures and international cooperation on nuclear security along the lines agreed to in the Washington, D.C., communiqué and plan of work.

We strongly support an enhanced role for the Agency and its nuclear security programme, and we are particularly interested in strengthening national capacities through advanced training and the development of a nuclear security culture. One concrete initiative in this area is the first course of the International School on Nuclear Security, inaugurated in April under the auspices of the Italian Government and in collaboration with the Agency and the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) at its premises in Trieste. As a result of the positive evaluation of this first course, Italy intends to develop the school further and offer it on a regular basis, in cooperation with the Agency and the ICTP and with the support of other donors.

Strengthening the international safeguards regime remains one of the shared goals of the Agency's member States. Italy upholds the Agency's role in verifying the full compliance of States with their non-proliferation obligations in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement. That is why we hope to see the additional protocol universally adopted, which would significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify through the agreement the peaceful use of all nuclear material held by States.

To achieve a world without weapons of mass destruction, every country must shoulder this collective responsibility and do its utmost to advance our non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. We strongly believe that the goals set at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT are achievable, and we continue to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and the three NPT depositary States to convene an international conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East.

The peaceful use of nuclear energy is still one of the Agency's main goals. We believe that the development of safe technology is extremely important to the improvement of nuclear applications worldwide, as is addressing global challenges and promoting the

relevant Millennium Development Goal through the adoption of carefully designed technical cooperation programmes. We are committed to fostering the Agency's activities in developing nuclear applications aimed at achieving medical and scientific advances in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resources and the protection of the environment. Despite the present international financial situation, support for the Technical Cooperation Fund and the activities under it to be promoted by the Agency remains of key importance.

In Italy's capacity as Chair of the Agency's Board of Governors, allow me to introduce, under agenda item 86, the draft resolution "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency", contained in document A/66/L.6, on behalf of Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United States of America, Uruguay and Zambia, as well as on behalf of Italy.

As in previous years, the consensus text, the result of consultations in Vienna, notes with appreciation the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency; takes note of the resolutions adopted at the fifty-fifth regular session of the IAEA General Conference held from 19 to 23 September; reaffirms the General Assembly's strong support for the Agency's indispensable role in encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses, in technology transfer to developing countries and in nuclear safety, verification and security; and appeals to Member States to continue to support the Agency's activities. The draft resolution is also open to further sponsorship, of course, and it is the hope of the sponsors that it will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. Vrailas (European Union): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States.

We are pleased to support draft resolution A/66/L.6 on the report (see A/66/95) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which again reaffirms the indispensable role of the Agency with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and in assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses, as well as in technology transfer to developing countries and in nuclear safety, verification and security.

This year has been overshadowed by the tragic consequences of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan on 11 March, which led to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The accident at Fukushima has changed the landscape of nuclear safety worldwide, and presents a strong challenge to the IAEA and the wider international community. The EU has sought to play its part in meeting this challenge. The EU-Japan summit of 28 May signalled enhanced EU-Japanese cooperation in promoting the highest standards of nuclear safety worldwide, working in particular through the IAEA and the Group of Eight and Group of 20 processes.

The Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety organized by the IAEA in June, in which the EU took an active part, began the process of ensuring that we, the international community, draw lessons from this accident and work to implement them in order to ensure the implementation of the highest standards of nuclear safety globally. The EU welcomes the declaration that emerged from the June meeting, followed by the IAEA's Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. We appreciate the Secretary-General's high-level meeting on nuclear safety, which took place in the margins of the General Assembly on 22 September.

International cooperation is crucial to promoting the global nuclear safety framework. In the light of the Fukushima accident, the EU is undertaking, as a matter of priority, a review of the safety of all EU nuclear power plants on the basis of a comprehensive and

transparent risk and safety assessment, or stress tests. Neighbouring and other countries have been invited to participate in these tests with the involvement of the IAEA and other relevant international organizations. In parallel with the stress tests, the EU will conduct a review of the existing European legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations, to be completed by the end of this year.

In 2009, the EU adopted a nuclear safety directive, giving binding legal force in all 27 EU member States to the main nuclear safety standards. A similar directive was adopted this July on the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

The EU remains committed to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We therefore welcomed the consensus reached at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The action plan agreed on, as well as the agreement on a process for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, including a conference to be convened in 2012, demonstrated our common resolve not only to uphold but also to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The EU organized a seminar in Brussels on 6 and 7 July to contribute to the process for the 2012 conference. The seminar allowed for inclusive participation and for an open and constructive exchange of views on the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We now look forward to the IAEA forum to be convened by the IAEA Director General, which will take place on 21 and 22 November in Vienna. This spirit of cooperation on the road to the 2012 conference is laudable, and we should all work to maintain it.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the role of the IAEA in verifying and assuring compliance by States with their safeguards obligations, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses. The EU remains deeply concerned by the protracted and serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic, as reported by the Director General of the IAEA. The EU reaffirms its understanding of the role of the Security Council, as the final arbiter of international peace and security, in taking appropriate action in the event of non-compliance with NPT obligations, including safeguards agreements.

The Agency's system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and plays an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. In that respect, the EU would like to express its strongest regret that, during the fifty-fifth session of the IAEA General Conference, no resolution was adopted on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol. This was the first session in which the resolution on strengthening safeguards was not adopted by the IAEA's General Conference. The EU calls on the Agency and the member States to work together to ensure that the important issue of safeguards is properly addressed at the fifty-sixth regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA.

The EU reiterates its view that the measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol form an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system, and that comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, constitute the current IAEA verification standard. The EU calls for the universalization of those two essential instruments of the IAEA safeguards system without delay.

The EU is of the view that countries considering or planning to include nuclear power in their energy strategies should closely cooperate with the IAEA so as to ensure that the most stringent legal, operational, safety, security and non-proliferation conditions are met. The EU remains firmly convinced of the benefits of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

In line with the NPT conclusions on this matter, the EU welcomes the steps taken to establish an IAEA low-enriched uranium bank and reaffirms the EU's commitment to providing financial support for the endeavour. The financing could comprise up to €20 million from the Instrument for Stability, plus an additional contribution of up to €5 million via a European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy decision.

We face a new era of threats from non-State actors, particularly terrorists who seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related technology and materials, one of the potentially most destructive

risks to global security. In the light of the ongoing threats, the EU is actively supporting the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009), as well as a number of other international initiatives.

Following the successful Nuclear Security Summit on 13 April 2010 in Washington, D.C., the EU looks forward to the follow-up summit in Seoul in March 2012, dedicated to reinforcing the commitments towards improving nuclear security worldwide.

The EU supports the important role played by the IAEA in advancing the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit. The EU supports IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The European Union is one of the main contributors to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund through its own contributions and through the contributions of individual EU member States, with a level of funding of around €30 million by the end of 2010.

In that respect, the EU welcomes the fact that, in the IAEA's regular budget, there is an increased proportion for the funding of nuclear security activities in the 2012-2013 programme and budget. Effective physical protection is of the utmost importance to prevent nuclear material from falling into the hands of terrorists or its accidental misuse, and to protect nuclear facilities against unauthorized use and malicious acts. The EU therefore urges all States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment.

The EU has also been a strong supporter of the IAEA technical cooperation programme. We value its role in the responsible development of peaceful applications of nuclear technology in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resources, the environment and nuclear energy, stressing nuclear and radiation safety in participating member States. The EU greatly values the contribution of technical cooperation programme projects to the Millennium Development Goals.

The European Union uses several of its financial instruments to support both the IAEA and cooperation with third countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, with a total amount of at least €150 million per year. Part of this funding is implemented in third countries through the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund, to which the EU and its member States are the first contributor.

Ms. Sodov (Mongolia): My delegation would like to thank Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for introducing the Agency's report (see A/66/95) and providing an update on developments since the report was submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration.

At the outset, the Mongolian Government would like to express once again its deep condolences and sincere sympathy to the people of Japan and its Government for the tragic loss of human life and suffering as a result of the 11 March earthquake and tsunami. The tragic event was a grave reminder of the need to close the existing safety gaps and continuously increase the safety and security of nuclear facilities around the world.

The IAEA, the only international organization with the relevant expertise, must lead the international effort to strengthen global nuclear safety and security. As rightly highlighted in its report, in the weeks immediately after the Fukushima accident the IAEA served as an international focal point in assisting the plant operator and the Japanese authorities in overcoming the disastrous consequences of the accident. It also played an important role in providing authenticated information on the situation at and around Fukushima.

It should also be pointed out that many member States, as well as the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the World Health Organization and other relevant international organizations worked closely together during the critical weeks, demonstrating the effectiveness of the United Nations one-house approach to addressing common challenges and needs.

My delegation commends the Agency for convening, in June, the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, which adopted a declaration aimed at further strengthening nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and protection from radiation of people and the environment throughout the world. Based on the declaration, the IAEA General Conference adopted an Action Plan on Nuclear Safety that envisions 12 main actions focusing on safety assessment, IAEA peer reviews, emergency preparedness and response,

capacity-building, communication and information dissemination, as well as research and development. Mongolia believes that vigorous implementation of the Action Plan would contribute tangibly to strengthening the nuclear safety regime.

We also believe that the convening, as proposed by the Government of Japan, of an international conference to consider the lessons of Fukushima would also be practically useful in improving emergency preparedness and relief. The post-Fukushima experience has clearly demonstrated the need to strengthen the international liability regime to enable sufficient compensation for the damage caused to people and the environment as a result of such accidents.

It is an established fact that nuclear safety and security are a common concern for countries all over the world. These days, they are especially important for countries like Mongolia, as it embarks on uranium exploitation and considers adding nuclear power to its energy mix. Mongolia is well aware that uranium exploitation entails great responsibility, including ensuring the physical security of nuclear material at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. It will therefore look to the Agency and its international partners for advice and assistance in the proper exploitation of its uranium reserves.

We are now considering conducting a pre-feasibility study with the Agency on whether nuclear power should be included in our energy mix. As part of its initial measures, the Mongolian Government is also working to accede to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

Mongolia further commends the IAEA's central role in promoting non-proliferation through safeguards and verification, and in promoting the transfer of nuclear knowledge, science and technology to its members. Judging by the IAEA projects in my country, I can say with confidence that the Agency makes a formidable contribution to global development efforts by providing the relevant skills, training and equipment. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the IAEA for its crucial assistance to developing countries, including my own country, Mongolia.

Last year, Mongolia was designated the eighth Model Demonstration Site (PMDS) country under the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT). As a PMDS, Mongolia is working to develop the required radiotherapy capacity to ensure effective early detection and treatment of cancer. The radiotherapy services will soon be broadened by the installation of a linear particle accelerator in our capital, Ulaanbaatar. In the framework of its cooperation with PACT, the Government of Mongolia has formulated a general action plan for cancer prevention and control for 2011 to 2021 and has adopted a strategic plan for radiotherapy development for the same period. The implementation of these policies will allow us to address the growing scourge of cancer more effectively and at the same time to share our experience as a PMDS country with others.

Other priority areas of our cooperation with the Agency include agriculture, food security and overall capacity-building. Being an agricultural country, Mongolia attaches great importance to increasing its agricultural production, especially meat production. Mongolia therefore places special focus on its cooperation with the Agency in the sustainable production and supply of vaccines and diagnostic kits to counter transboundary animal diseases.

As a landlocked country with a dry climate, Mongolia welcomed the focus of this year's Scientific Forum on water and the prospects of its better uses with nuclear technologies, which was held during the IAEA General Conference.

This year Mongolia has submitted eight project proposals for the new biennial project cycle 2012-2013, in accordance with its priority needs and the Agency's mandate. It gives me great pleasure to note that our commitment to strong cooperation with the Agency can be seen from the fact that the IAEA projects in Mongolia have the highest implementation rate in the Asia-Pacific region this year.

As in previous years, my delegation is pleased to be a sponsor of the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA, as contained in document A/66/L.6.

Mr. Tarar (Pakistan): We would like to express our appreciation for the annual report (see A/66/95) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for the efforts of the Agency and its Director General. Pakistan recently concluded its term as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors for 2010-2011, and our chairmanship underscored the international

community's confidence in Pakistan's contributions to and role in matters within the Agency's ambit.

In the 54 years since its establishment, the IAEA has emerged as a successful organization in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, contributing to peace and security and advancing socio-economic development. The Agency's role has become even more important in an increasingly complex and challenging international environment. The fast-growing global energy demands, shortages of fossil fuel reserves and diverse environmental challenges, along with safety and security concerns, are likely to engage the IAEA for the foreseeable future. In discharging these functions, it will be important for the Agency to be seen as an impartial, efficient and professional body — not just a nuclear watchdog.

We agree with the Agency's post-Fukushima assessment that nuclear energy will remain a preferable viable, safe and sustainable alternative power source. The events at the Fukushima nuclear plants brought into focus the justifiable public anxiety over the nuclear safety regime. We fully support the IAEA's role in leading the global efforts to evaluate and institutionalize the lessons-learned process from the Fukushima event. The Agency's efforts, including the convening of a ministerial conference on nuclear safety and the adoption of a Nuclear Safety Action Plan, have been both timely and useful. The high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security, held by the Secretary-General here in New York in September, also served to catalyse international attention to the important issues of nuclear safety.

The Action Plan prepared by the IAEA and its member States provides an important foundation for strengthening the nuclear safety framework worldwide. The high-level meeting rightly reaffirmed the support of its participants for the Agency's leadership role in the lessons-learned process and in enabling its member States to implement those lessons nationally.

In evolving a strengthened nuclear safety regime, it is essential to take into account the varied nature of countries' needs and circumstances. The course-correction proposals and modalities should be based on technical and objective assessments. The effective implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety will depend in large measure on, inter alia, the degree of international assistance and cooperation given to developing countries. We fully endorse the views of the Non-Aligned Movement on this vital aspect, and we look forward to working with member States in carrying forward an agreed nuclear safety agenda.

For our part, we have already begun a comprehensive safety review of existing power plants in areas such as site studies, safety systems, emergency power systems, off-site emergency preparedness, and so forth. Such safety appraisals will also be applicable to our future nuclear power plants. We will examine the outcome of this review and make modifications as necessary.

The IAEA and Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission were launched five decades ago, almost at the same time. The two organizations have grown together and have a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship, which has been of immense value to Pakistan.

We have benefited from the expertise made available in the form of expert missions, operational safety review teams, assessment of safety significant events team missions, and the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme. We attach the highest importance to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and would like to stress the need for enhanced and assured resource allocation for technical cooperation activities, technology transfer and training facilities for developing countries, inter alia through greater involvement of developing countries in the programme's design and implementation.

Pakistan has long been a strong advocate of utilizing nuclear technology for peace, progress and prosperity for all. The revival of the economy and the socio-economic development of our people is the foremost priority of the Government of Pakistan. Safe and sustainable nuclear energy is essential to advancing our development agenda. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission is actively engaged in the application of nuclear technology for the socio-economic uplift of the country, which includes such areas as cancer diagnosis and treatment, agriculture, food preservation, water management and industry. But our most important task remains harnessing nuclear energy for the generation of electrical power.

At present, the share of nuclear power in Pakistan's electricity mix is rather modest. We wish to enhance the current level of 750 megawatts (MW) nuclear-power-generation capacity to 8,800 MW by the

year 2030. This is a challenging but an equally important development imperative that we are determined to pursue. Early this year, the unanimous approval by the IAEA Board of the C3 and C4 power plants safeguards agreement reflected the international community's recognition of Pakistan's expertise in the safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants. The conclusion of this safeguards agreement relating to the two power plants, each of which has a 340-MW power-generation capacity, is an important milestone towards our energy security strategy.

The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission is currently operating 14 nuclear medicine and oncology hospitals across the country, while four such hospitals are under construction. These are still not enough for our very large population, and we intend to continue to expand our capabilities in the public sector to cater to the poor and the deserving.

We produce most of the radiopharmaceuticals required domestically and, having recently installed a facility for the production of molybdenum-99, are now in a position to export it. Our agriculture and biotechnology centres are also making valuable contributions to the agriculture and livestock sectors of the country.

In addition, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission has developed a very sound infrastructure for addressing various problems related to water-resource management using isotope techniques. We are taking part in the IAEA programme involving the inter-calibration of standards and are also providing expert and analytical services in this field to IAEA member States in the region. We have a network of in-house educational and training institutions that encompass all major facets of nuclear science and technology. Besides meeting the needs of our own programmes, these institutes are ready to welcome participants from other IAEA member States.

We appreciate the assistance that the IAEA has provided through expert services, equipment and human resource development in helping us to establish and improve all these facilities. This is an area in which IAEA is obligated to foster growth in other countries as well, and, with our experience, we can also help.

Nuclear security has emerged as an important area requiring adequate attention and response. While we support the international focus on and efforts to advance the objectives of nuclear security, we share the IAEA view that responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each State.

At the international level, the IAEA has the leading and central role in evolving guidelines, recommendations, codes and guidance documents in the area of nuclear security. Given its mandate, technical competence and wide membership, the IAEA is a unique platform for its member States to consider proposals for reviewing and strengthening the international framework on nuclear security.

Ms. King (Australia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

In recent years, a number of initiatives and activities have sprung up globally to promote the nuclear security agenda, often with overlapping work. We fully share the concerns of the IAEA over the continuing duplication of nuclear-security-related activities. We wish to reaffirm that the IAEA has the unique role, authority, competency and legitimacy to lead and coordinate policy, operational activities and assistance provision in the field of nuclear security.

Similarly, it would be counterproductive, both financially and politically, to duplicate nuclear-security-related activities, particularly in the design and development of parallel guidelines, recommendations, standards and guidance documents in various areas related to nuclear security.

Given the distinct nature, character and implementation structures of the IAEA for nuclear safety and nuclear security, we would advise against the pursuit of a single series of standards in the areas of nuclear safety and security. These two areas have divergent philosophies, causes, legal instruments and operational requirements, although the two may share a degree of common risks.

Pakistan has taken several legislative, organizational and administrative steps to augment the safety and security of our nuclear installations, facilities, materials and regulatory framework. Our Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has completed 10 years of its professional work as an effective overseer. The Authority has grown rapidly in the last decade, establishing itself as a strong, independent and credible overseer.

The PNRA has augmented its regulatory infrastructure and expanded the scope of its regulatory

processes. It has also achieved important milestones, that is, from the regulatory oversight of nuclear materials and equipment to the management of radioactive sources. In doing so, the PNRA has followed international standards and practices while maintaining very close links with the IAEA, as both a recipient and a giver.

The professional approach with which the PNRA has executed the nuclear security action plan in Pakistan has won it wide appreciation among its global peers. It is now implementing the second phase of the plan, in collaboration with the IAEA. In addition, we have participated for several years now in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database.

The global non-proliferation architecture has witnessed major transformations in recent years. We have seen trends and policies that have dealt major blows to the non-proliferation regime. Policies and practices based on commercial and political considerations have eroded the sanctity of the long-standing norms and legal instruments that underpin the non-proliferation regime.

Pakistan believes in an equitable, non-discriminatory and criteria-based approach to advancing the universally shared goals of non-proliferation and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We also hope that considerations of nuclear safety and nuclear security would facilitate, not hinder, the pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for advancing the development agenda and offsetting environmental degradation.

Mr. Gupta (India): My delegation thanks the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for his statement, which provided additional information on the main developments in the activities of the Agency for 2010. We also commend the IAEA for its 2010 report (see A/66/95), which underscores the central role of the Agency in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. India participated in the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security called for by the Secretary-General, held in New York on 22 September.

We are considering worldwide nuclear-related developments in 2010 against the backdrop of the series of serious accidents that occurred in March 2011 at several installations at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants in Japan following a devastating earthquake and the resulting tsunami.

The Fukushima nuclear incident attracted worldwide attention and has raised concerns about nuclear safety in the face of natural calamities of a particularly large magnitude. We are convinced that the world nuclear community will rise to the occasion and take all necessary measures to assuage the concerns of the public at large about the safety of nuclear power plants. It is imperative that Member States join hands to strengthen the IAEA, which has a leading role in channelling global efforts on nuclear safety. India supports the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, endorsed by the General Conference on 22 September.

The role of nuclear power as a clean source of energy that is essential to meet growing energy needs and to address concerns about climate change must not be undermined. Nuclear safety should be seen not as a static but as a continuously evolving process. The Agency must play an important role, in coordination with all relevant stakeholders, to further strengthen it. At this juncture, it is imperative for the Agency to take all the necessary measures to allay the apprehensions of the public and Member States about the safety of nuclear power plants, taking into account current advances in design and technology. We encourage the Agency to continue supporting all activities related to the promotion of nuclear power.

India views nuclear energy as an essential element of its national energy basket. We are committed to taking forward our three-stage nuclear programme based on a closed fuel cycle. We envisage a major expansion of nuclear energy in the coming decades, reaching 20,000 megawatts (MW) by 2020 and projected to grow to 60,000 MW by 2030.

Our nuclear safety track record has been impeccable in over 345 reactor-years of operation, but we recognize the importance of continuous improvement and innovation in our nuclear safety standards and practices covering the entire range of activities — siting, design, construction, operation and up-grading.

The Government of India has repeatedly underscored that the safety of our nuclear plants is a matter of the highest priority. The Government has undertaken a number of measures. They include the introduction of a bill in Parliament to change the functional status of India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board to a de jure independent nuclear regulatory authority. Six safety review committees have looked

into various aspects of nuclear safety and, while detailed reviews are being evaluated, certain enhanced safety measures are already being implemented. India will invite the IAEA operational safety review teams to assist in Indian safety reviews and audits. All reactors, whether indigenous or imported, will without exception meet the enhanced safety standards.

Safety evaluation reports and follow-up measures are being put in the public domain so as to enhance transparency and boost public confidence. There is increased focus on emergency preparedness and response to possible nuclear accidents that are beyond design-basis accidents. India's National Disaster Management Authority has drawn up a document, entitled "Management of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies", which provides a holistic and integrated approach to disaster management, covering all its components — prevention, mitigation, preparedness, compliance with regulatory requirements, capacity development, response, relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

India's nuclear programme is oriented towards maximizing the energy potential of available uranium resources and the utilization of the large thorium reserve. We believe that available global uranium resources cannot sustain the projected expansion of nuclear power without adopting the closed fuel-cycle approach. We encourage the Agency to further engage itself in the thorium fuel cycle.

We welcome the inclusion of activities related to nuclear reactor technology development. My delegation fully supports the activities of the Agency undertaken to stimulate innovation in nuclear power through technical working groups for different reactor technologies, for small- and medium-sized reactors, and for non-electric applications. The coordinated research projects organized by the Agency provide an excellent forum for increasing understanding and the further development of technology. We welcome the release in 2010 of an updated version of its Advanced Reactor Information System, containing comprehensive information on all advanced reactor designs and concepts.

India has been associated with the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles since its inception. We have contributed significantly to its progress and believe that the programme has great potential to make nuclear energy accessible in a safe and sustainable manner, particularly to new entrants embarking on that path.

India attaches great importance to the Agency's work in the fields of nuclear science. We contribute to those activities through participation in the technical meetings and coordinated research projects, and we also support the Agency's programme in nuclear fusion. India makes a contribution to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) programme by providing special hardware items and specialized expertise. In 2010, the construction of a laboratory building for ITER-India was nearly completed.

My delegation is of the view that the Agency's work programme and achievements in the area of nuclear applications are of significance and special value in meeting the needs of developing countries. Activities in the spheres of food and agriculture, human health and nutrition and water resources, among others, are notable in that connection.

Experts from India regularly participate in all those programmes and provide support to the Agency. The Bhabhatron telecobalt unit donated by the Government of India to Vietnam through the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy was successfully commissioned in 2010. The installation of another Bhabhatron unit in Sri Lanka, donated through a similar arrangement, is currently in progress. Indian experts are providing full support to Sri Lanka in the construction, installation and commissioning of the facility and in training the technical staff. Our delegation commends the Agency for its activities related to nuclear knowledge management and capacity-building in member States. In that context, we are pleased to note the designation of St. John's Research Institute, in Bengaluru, as the first IAEA Collaborating Centre for Nutrition.

India supports the work of the IAEA. That is why we have sponsored draft resolution A/66/L.6, on the Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Ms. Camejo (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Cuba welcomes and supports the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The application of nuclear techniques contributes to mitigating soil deterioration, desertification, warming of the atmosphere and other natural phenomena that affect the production of food and the life of humankind on Earth.

We attach high priority to cooperation among developing countries. In that regard, Cuba has actively participated throughout the 26 years since the establishment of the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL). Within that context, the countries of our region and the secretariat of the IAEA have achieved significant results, in particular in bringing about the strategic partnership set up between ARCAL and the Agency.

Furthermore, our participation in the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies (FORO) has contributed to the goal of maintaining a high level of radiological, nuclear and physical security in the member countries and, by extension, throughout the entire Ibero-American region. The Forum is an association comprising the regulatory agencies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Spain and Uruguay, and has worked hard in key new areas of radiological and nuclear security. It has shared knowledge and information among the regulatory bodies through the Ibero-American network, whose intrinsic value we hope to promote. Cuba is pleased that, under its presidency next year, we will celebrate FORO's fifteenth anniversary.

The technical cooperation pillar of the IAEA should be strengthened and should unconditionally receive the resources that it needs, in accordance with its priority status. Our commitment to technical cooperation is strong, as the following examples, among others, demonstrate. By 2010, we had implemented 77 per cent of a technical cooperation project, maintaining the high level of implementation that Cuba has historically shown. However, that was slightly lower than in other years, owing to the effects of the blockade that the United States Government maintains against our people.

Seven foreigners have received grants for scientific visits. We undertook more than 50 expert missions, of which nine were for technical meetings, 23 for regional projects and 18 within the framework of ARCAL. We took part in 20 ARCAL projects, meeting 100 per cent of the commitments made by Cuba under that programme. The first four meetings of ARCAL were held in Cuba as a lead country for such projects.

Within the context of ARCAL, we organized 20 courses and workshops, eight cooperation meetings and 18 expert missions, and took part in ordinary and extraordinary meetings of its technical and political bodies. Moreover, we participated in six regional projects on radiation protection. Our country also participated extensively in joint research projects. In 2010, Cuban researchers were included in 15 research contracts under those programmes.

Cuba has met its financial commitments to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, including by contributing 100 per cent of expenses for national participation.

While underscoring the important role of the IAEA and its links with the United Nations system, in particular the disarmament machinery, we take this opportunity to reiterate that our joint efforts must continue in order to uphold nuclear disarmament as the highest priority, given the grave threat that the mere existence of more than 22,000 nuclear warheads and the military doctrines and strategies that perpetuate their possession and use poses to international peace and security and the survival of humankind.

The economic, trade and financial blockade imposed by the Government of the United States of America against Cuba for more than 50 years also affects the activities of the IAEA in our country and contravenes the Agency's statute. Since December 2010, the blockade has caused my country economic losses of more than $975 billion, at the current value of that currency.

Owing to the blockade, the IAEA has had difficulties in obtaining specialized equipment for projects in Cuba, since American companies, or those that work with capital from that country, cannot sell such equipment for use in Cuba without possible sanctions. In addition, our citizens face difficulties in participating in training organized in the United States. The blockade also affects the implementation of projects on fighting cancer, which is one of the IAEA's priorities.

While denouncing once again the unjust and criminal blockade, condemned in this very Hall only a few days ago by the overwhelming majority of United Nations Members (see A/66/PV.41), Cuba nevertheless acknowledges the ongoing efforts of the secretariat of the IAEA to seek alternatives and solutions to that reality. We recognize the efforts of the IAEA to

strengthen radiation security, transportation, radioactive waste management and emergency preparedness in countries as a guarantor of safe use of radioactive sources.

Cuba devotes significant human resources and materials to nuclear safety. It invests in those areas in Latin America and the Caribbean, including by organizing regional activities and contributing to radiation protection experts and services. As a member of the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies, Cuba takes an active part in medical projects.

The serious nuclear accident that took place in Japan as a result of the huge earthquake and tsunami in that country showed that there is still much to learn in the nuclear safety area. We should step up our efforts towards greater security in the face of natural disasters. Cuba attaches special importance to what was agreed in the declaration of the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, held in June, and the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety adopted at the fifty-fifth General Conference.

We reaffirm the need to strengthen the international nuclear regime, for which we place the primary responsibility on nuclear-weapon States, and urge that the IAEA be granted the central role in promoting and coordinating international efforts and cooperation, so as to strengthen global nuclear security.

Cuba is one of the small group of countries certified by the IAEA as being in strict compliance with its safeguards commitments. That confirms that we are a country that has no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. We attach great importance to the sensitive issue of safeguards and to the impartial and professional action of the IAEA secretariat in the activities that it promotes in that area. We have repeatedly criticized the manipulation and politicization of the IAEA for political purposes, as well as the double standards that are unfortunately common in its analyses. As activities in that area are the exclusive province of the IAEA, we reiterate our rejection of any of its decisions in which the Security Council has been involved.

We reaffirm that verification activities must, first and foremost, respect the sovereignty and national interests of member States. We urge the IAEA secretariat to continue working to create a climate of impartiality, trust, understanding and transparency, based on objectivity and truth, which will help to resolve specific cases involving compliance with safeguards agreements being considered by the Board of Governors and the IAEA General Conference. In that regard, we underline the need to respect the inalienable right of all States to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

We confirm our support for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and for a solution negotiated by all parties involved.

We also reiterate our support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. To achieve that goal, Israel must immediately and unconditionally accede to the NPT and submit its nuclear installations to the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA.

We are pleased that Finland has been chosen as facilitator and host Government for next year's conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which we hope will produce concrete proposals for achieving that goal.

I would like to conclude by stressing that we all share a responsibility to bequeath a safer world to future generations. That is why nuclear disarmament cannot continue to be a goal that is constantly postponed and subjected to conditions. Cuba will stand firm in the struggle for a better world that is free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Wang Min (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation welcomes the report of Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on the work of the Agency.

Over the past year, the Agency carried out a great deal of work in accordance with its statutory mandate. In the aftermath of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident last March, the Agency has played an important role in communicating accident information to member States and in assisting Japan with accident response. In June, the Agency convened the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, which resulted in the adoption of a ministerial declaration and the consolidation of international consensus on nuclear safety. The Agency developed a comprehensive Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which sets out concrete nuclear safety recommendations.

China believes that the Agency's efforts are of great importance in improving international nuclear safety and emergency response performance, promoting relevant international cooperation and safeguarding the safe and sustainable development of global nuclear energy.

At the same time, through its Technical Cooperation Programme, the IAEA has provided guidance to member States for the development of nuclear power projects and promoted the application of nuclear technology in a range of areas, such as human health, medical services, food and agriculture, and environmental protection. The Agency has actively assisted member States in strengthening their nuclear security and safety capabilities and provided technical support concerning the safe operation of nuclear power plants. The IAEA has made continuous efforts to promote the universality of the comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocol, and has earnestly performed its safeguards function. China is glad to see that the work of the Agency in those areas has been widely recognized and supported by member States.

Today, nuclear energy is playing an irreplaceable role in safeguarding nuclear security, promoting economic development and combating climate change. In its nuclear energy development activities, China always adheres to the principle of safety first. China has established a fairly comprehensive legal framework and system of standards on nuclear safety and security, put in place an independent and effective supervisory and regulatory framework, set up a comprehensive emergency response mechanism and maintained a good safety record in general. In order to enhance nuclear safety, China has always supported and actively participated in relevant international and regional exchanges and cooperation, and has also introduced and applied advanced nuclear power technologies.

China also attaches great importance to nuclear security capacity-building, and supports and actively participates in relevant international cooperation initiatives. China ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Currently, China is working with interested countries to establish a centre of excellence for nuclear security in China.

China supports the Agency's central role in nuclear security and has decided to contribute $200,000 to its Nuclear Security Fund in order to enhance the nuclear security capability of the Asia-Pacific region.

At the same time, China strictly fulfils its safeguards obligations and actively supports the Agency's efforts to improve its verification capabilities and to promote the effectiveness and the universality of the international safeguards regime.

China supports the Agency's efforts to pursue its Technical Cooperation Programme and to promote the development of nuclear power and the application of nuclear technology. China is ready to its utmost to provide, through the Agency, assistance to other countries by sharing its accumulated experience in developing its own nuclear energy.

The IAEA has been shouldering important responsibilities in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. In facing the new nuclear safety and security situation after the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Agency should further strengthen its leading role in enhancing nuclear safety and promoting relevant international cooperation. It is China's hope that the Agency will give priority to the following aspects.

First, the Agency should take further stock of the experiences and lessons of the Fukushima nuclear accident, help member States to enhance nuclear safety and emergency response capabilities, and promote the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, with a view to restoring public confidence in nuclear energy.

Secondly, it should increase technical assistance to developing countries, improve the national nuclear infrastructure of newcomer countries and promote the safe, secure and sustainable development of nuclear energy.

Thirdly, it should strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime and effectively prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

Fourthly, it should maintain an objective and impartial stand on sensitive and hot-button nuclear issues and play a constructive role in appropriately resolving those issues with diplomatic efforts.

Mr. Camp (United States of America): The United States looks forward to the adoption of the draft resolution (A/66/L.6) of the General Assembly on the report (see A/66/95) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States co-sponsored the draft resolution as an expression of its strong support for the Agency and its critical role in accelerating and enlarging the contributions of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.

As Secretary Clinton noted during her remarks to the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security, convened by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon: "This year the International Atomic Energy Agency has, again, proven itself to be an indispensable forum for monitoring and supporting the peaceful nuclear activity of countries."

As an example of our enduring and wide-ranging support for the Agency, the United States has made significant extrabudgetary contributions to Agency programmes related to nuclear safeguards, nuclear safety, nuclear security and technical cooperation. In addition, President Obama's IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, announced by Secretary Clinton at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, aims to highlight and strengthen the Agency's role in increasing access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear technologies, including in the areas of human health, food security, water resources management and nuclear power. The United States pledged $50 million in extrabudgetary funding to the Peaceful Uses Initiative over five years, and we urge other Member States to join in this endeavour and to match that amount.

The United States would also like to express its sincere appreciation to Director General Amano for his leadership and for his report to the General Assembly. We look forward to continuing to work with the Director General, the Agency secretariat and all member States to advance the important work of the IAEA in the years ahead. The United States remains committed to ensuring that the Agency has the resources and authorities it needs to address the numerous and growing challenges in confronts.

Mr. Tsymbaliuk (Ukraine): The date of 26 April 2011 marked a quarter of a century since the day when the catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant dispelled the illusions of today's world about the complete safety of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Considering this event through a quarter of a century's history, it is obvious that a responsible and holistic approach to the atom for peace is the only precondition for a safe world in the future.

My country's strategy to address the lingering after-effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe is aimed at fostering the region's long-term development and providing people with the support they need to lead safe and healthy lives.

In commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe, the President and the Government of Ukraine organized two important international events in Kyiv in 2011: the Kyiv Summit for the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy, and an international scientific conference on the theme "Twenty-five years after the Chernobyl accident — safety for the future".

We believe that one of the outcomes of the Kyiv Summit was the unanimous recognition by its participants of the need to secure an adequate level of nuclear safety as the key priority throughout each and every stage of nuclear energy production. We would like to express our appreciation for the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General in both the Kyiv Summit and the scientific conference, as well as for the support the Agency continues to provide to Ukraine for mitigation of the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

The Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986 triggered not only the revision of international nuclear safety standards, but the creation of numerous international instruments to ensure both the highest level of nuclear waste and radiation safety worldwide and the relevant system of emergency preparedness and response.

In 2011 those instruments were put into test. This year was difficult for the Agency because of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. We believe that given its unique capabilities and expertise, the Agency has a leading role to play in any nuclear-related accident or emergency and that its on-site involvement is vital in addressing situations like the one at Fukushima.

Based on the lessons already learned from the accident, we in Ukraine have conducted a targeted reassessment of the safety of all our nuclear power

units in operation. We have introduced measures to reinforce the independent position of the national nuclear regulatory authority and, as the top priority, launched a comprehensive review of the national nuclear regulatory framework. We have also joined the European Union stress tests and the relevant peer review process.

We welcome the outcome of the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety held in June in Vienna. We expected the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety requested by the Ministerial Conference to be more ambitious in terms of peer review missions and transparency. But even as a common denominator of the current positions of States, we do note some important steps in the Plan that may strengthen peer review services and mechanisms in future. We consider those elements to have particular practical value.

While responsibility for nuclear safety rests with each member State, we believe that the IAEA Safety Fundamentals and Safety Requirements should constitute the minimum obligatory basis for States that have active civil nuclear programmes with working nuclear power plants and research reactors. It is clear that the existing international treaty basis concerning reaction to nuclear disasters requires improvement. We have before us some new proposals by States to improve those instruments, as well as the Nuclear Safety Convention. We believe that they are worthy of our further consideration.

Developments in Japan have resulted in widespread concern about the safety of nuclear power plants worldwide and have led to deliberations and concerns about the feasibility of nuclear energy as a source of power generation. It is clear that there are many lessons to be learned from the Fukushima accident. In that connection, we welcome the announcement by the Government of Japan of plans to hold in 2012, in cooperation with the IAEA, an international conference on nuclear safety, based on the findings of the investigation of the nuclear power accidents.

We strongly support the Agency's activities aimed at improving nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety worldwide. Ukraine reaffirms its view that the responsibility for nuclear security rests with each individual State. All States have the responsibility to establish appropriate systems and take necessary measures to prevent, detect and respond to malicious acts involving nuclear material.

Ukraine supports the implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013. We acknowledge the progress achieved by the Agency in improving control over radioactive sources. In 2010 Ukraine announced its decision to get rid of all stocks of highly enriched uranium by the time of the next Nuclear Security Summit, while our partners will provide necessary technical and financial assistance to support this effort.

In that connection, we note with concern that six years after the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted by consensus, only 49 of the 145 parties to the Convention have adhered to the Amendment. Adherence to the international legal instruments relevant to nuclear security continues to increase, but at a slow pace. Ukraine calls upon all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Amendment as soon as possible and to act in accordance with the objective and purpose of the Amendment pending its entry into force.

Ukraine highly values the IAEA role in nuclear security competence development. We pay considerable attention to the issue at the national level. With the graduation of another 14 nuclear security engineers from the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Technology we have reached an important milestone. We commend the Agency for its invaluable support to us in developing training and education facilities for nuclear security purposes at the Sevastopol National University, which became the Agency's earliest partner in establishing nuclear security education. We confirm our willingness to contribute to the implementation of the IAEA nuclear security education programmes.

Ukraine also appreciates the considerable work done by the Agency in strengthening nuclear security measures in connection with major public events, particularly the support that is being consistently provided to Ukraine and Poland in preparation for the 2012 Union of European Football Associations European Football Championship.

Ukraine reaffirms the Agency's role in verifying and ensuring compliance by States with their safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agency's

system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The measures contained in the additional protocol form an integral part of this system. The comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the additional protocol, constitutes the current best verification standard. We note the increased number of countries that have brought into force the additional protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement. Universal adherence by States to both instruments would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and contribute to further enhancing security worldwide.

Since January 2006, Ukraine has had a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol in force. Over the past few years, we have worked hard, together with the IAEA, to receive its broader conclusion on the implementation of our safeguards obligations. The IAEA safeguards implementation report for 2010 acknowledged our efforts. In 2010, Ukraine received, for the first time, the IAEA broader conclusion. We continue to work with the Agency to establish the conditions necessary for the application of IAEA integrated safeguards in Ukraine.

We recognize the importance of supporting research on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially safety, waste management, radiation protection, the safety and efficiency aspects of advanced technology, and the importance of enhancing international cooperation in those fields. Maintaining competence and know-how across the nuclear sector is fundamental to these activities. We view positively the increased amount of research being carried out by the IAEA concerning innovative reactor technologies and fuel cycles. Ukraine offers the relevant expert services to the IAEA, free of charge, in the context of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles. Ukraine will continue to cooperate actively with the IAEA in the development and implementation of regional programmes addressing the issues of the non-power use of nuclear technologies, namely, medical applications, dosimetry and mitigation of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

Ukraine has always been a strong supporter of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, which constitutes an important statutory function of the Agency. Ukraine considers the implementation of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as the cornerstone of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I wish to commend the work done by the IAEA in planning and implementing such programmes and activities, which reflect the needs of different countries and different regions. Addressing the global challenges of hunger, disease, poverty and water-resource management, as well as the creation of a cleaner and safer environment, is of particular significance to developing countries. Ukraine values the efforts of the Agency in those areas.

Regional and national technical cooperation projects have contributed to the safety and effectiveness of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Ukraine. We have demonstrated the tangible and sustainable results of our cooperation, particularly regarding safety improvements at our nuclear power plants. We also appreciate the results already achieved in improving the quality and effectiveness of nuclear medicine, radiotherapy and medical physics.

I would like to mention in particular the modern equipment and training for nuclear oncology and radiotherapy that has been provided to us. Human health will remain one of the priorities of our technical cooperation programme in the future.

Ukraine considers it important for technical cooperation management and project implementation to become more efficient and effective, for the benefit of all Member States. It is important to ensure fair access to technical cooperation funds and the predictable funding of such programmes. Beneficiary countries are key actors in achieving a successful outcome in their respective technical cooperation projects. The key to effectiveness is to meet the real needs of the Member States. In order to maximize the socio-economic impact of the programmes, it is crucial that the IAEA further develop partnerships with other organizations where appropriate.

In conclusion, we would like to join other delegations in welcoming the IAEA report (see A/66/95) to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session and express our deep appreciation for the work of the IAEA Director General and the Agency.

Ms. Karim (Singapore): The Singapore delegation would like to thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Yukiya Amano, and his secretariat for the IAEA's comprehensive annual report (see A/66/95).

As the global focal point for nuclear cooperation, the IAEA continues to play a crucial role in promoting the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Its mission of safety and security, safeguards and verification, and science and technology constitute a comprehensive regime, each pillar of which is equally essential. Singapore strongly supports the IAEA's important work and is pleased to sponsor the draft resolution (A/66/L.6) on the report of the IAEA.

Nuclear safety came into the spotlight this year with the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, in March. The Fukushima accident demonstrated the grave dangers posed by low-probability, high-impact accidents that are difficult to predict and guard against. We must therefore work together to further strengthen the global nuclear safety framework and the global emergency preparedness and response mechanisms for nuclear emergencies. Singapore believes that the IAEA should drive that process.

We thank the Director General for convening the high-level Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in Vienna in June 2011, to learn from the experiences of the Fukushima accident. The Conference and the adoption of the 12-point action plan at the IAEA General Conference in September was a first step forward towards a comprehensive review of the global nuclear safety framework. The process is a continuing one. Unfortunately, some continue to insist that the current global nuclear safety infrastructure is fine as it currently stands and that all that is required is better adherence to and implementation of current practices. My delegation urges all parties to keep an open mind in engaging in an honest and open review of the global nuclear safety framework, and to accord the highest consideration to ensuring the safety of nuclear installations. Although the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States, we must not forget that any accident would have a far-reaching and potentially devastating transboundary impact. If we were to do less, the potential grave consequences would be unforgivable, as we would have had a chance to do better but did not because of narrow interests.

Nuclear non-proliferation remains a core aspect of the IAEA's mission. Singapore firmly believes that all States have the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the same time, the IAEA has the vital task of ensuring that nuclear material and technology meant for peaceful purposes are not diverted for non-civilian uses that could threaten regional and international peace and stability. The IAEA's safeguards and verification regimes provide credible assurance that declared nuclear material and facilities are for peaceful uses. It is therefore both in the interests and the responsibility of all States to comply with these regimes. In that connection, Singapore strongly urges all States that have not done so to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Those States that have done so should fully implement those agreements. As the number of nuclear power reactors is likely to increase by at least 90, and up to 350, by the year 2030, it is crucial that countries enforce and step up their individual measures to ensure security against theft of nuclear material for illicit purposes and malicious attacks against nuclear facilities.

A peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons is one that we all aspire to. The IAEA has a unique and important mission to fulfil in the promotion of peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology and in ensuring that they benefit as many citizens of the world as possible. Some important areas that come to mind include the fields of cancer treatment, food security and water management. This is all the more pertinent given that the world population is continuing to grow and the competition for resources is increasingly tighter.

As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Singapore would like to reiterate our continued support for the Agency's vital role and tasks. Singapore's cooperation with the IAEA focuses on the applications of nuclear technology in areas such as industry, health and radiation protection. Over the past decade, we have hosted 22 scientific visits, 83 fellowship attachments and 24 regional training events with the IAEA. The most recent event was the regional seminar on the Agency's safeguards system for South-East Asian States with significant nuclear activities, held in March this year.

In our remaining year on the Board, we will continue to exert our utmost efforts for the advancement of the IAEA's mission.

Mr. Ciobo (Australia): Australia is pleased to have the opportunity to commend Director General Mr. Yukiya Amano for his briefing on the achievements

of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the challenges it will face over the coming years. We are honoured to be a member of the IAEA Board of Governors and take very seriously the responsibility that entails. Australia attaches great importance to the central role played by the IAEA in improving the safety and security of nuclear activities, enlarging the humanitarian contribution of nuclear technology and verifying States' non-proliferation commitments.

This year, the twenty-fifth anniversary year of the Chernobyl accident, we saw the devastating natural disasters in Japan and the subsequent accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant. Our thoughts continue to be with Japan and its people.

We welcome Director General Amano's actions and initiatives regarding nuclear safety in the wake of Fukushima. We are pleased to have been able to participate in the IAEA Ministerial Conference in June and to have contributed to the efforts to improve nuclear safety and to address public confidence, as reflected in the ministerial declaration and subsequently in the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety adopted by the IAEA General Conference.

The Action Plan is a strong and practical demonstration of the priority we all attach to achieving the highest possible standards with regard to nuclear safety. We encourage States to be proactive in undertaking the actions outlined in the Plan and any additional actions that are relevant to their own circumstances.

Australia continues to work closely with the Agency and our regional neighbours with regard to nuclear safety and security. Australia is committed to best international practice in regard to safeguards, safety and the security of nuclear material. Signifying this commitment, Australia, in collaboration with the IAEA, has established an informal Vienna-based contact group for existing and prospective uranium mining companies, with the easy-to-remember acronym "FoRUM" — Friends of Responsible Uranium Mining — as a means of exchanging views and experiences with regard to best-practice mining of uranium.

Safety measures are not the only elements required to properly protect people and the environment. Australia is also a strong supporter of the Agency's nuclear security programme and its role in international nuclear security initiatives and activities.

The IAEA safeguards system is one of the central pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. To be completely effective, the system must have universal coverage. We continue to call upon all of the States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that have yet to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements as well as additional protocols, and to do so without delay.

Australia has long emphasized the importance of the universalization of the NPT. We encourage those States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

States must comply with their safeguards obligations. IAEA safeguards obligations are not voluntary. It is therefore a matter of continuing regret and deep concern that certain States continue to be in breach of their safeguards obligations. We call upon those countries to engage with the Agency to resolve all issues, demonstrate conclusively the peaceful intent of their nuclear programme and comply fully with all of their international obligations. Australia commends the Agency for its continuing efforts to resolve those issues.

Australia continues to work closely with the Agency and our regional neighbours on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Australia shares its skilled scientific research base with other Member States and facilitates the use and exchange of equipment and personnel in fields relevant to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. We are pleased to maintain our strong support for and contribution to the Agency's technical cooperation programme.

I am pleased to recall that in the spirit of the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, Australia contributed A$100,000 to the IAEA for the marine benchmark study on the possible impact of the Fukushima radioactive releases in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia worked closely with our regional neighbours to formulate the project and acknowledges the role of the IAEA in achieving its prompt initiation, with the first meeting hosted in Sydney in late August.

The Agency plays a vital role in enhancing States' capabilities to prevent, diagnose and treat health problems through the use of nuclear techniques. We should never lose sight of such humanitarian benefits, which the IAEA is uniquely able to provide worldwide.

Australia works closely with the Agency in those areas and is pleased to coordinate with it in providing clinical education in radiation medical physics to countries in South-East Asia.

The external environment in which the Agency operates is highly fluid, and the Agency must maintain the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to external developments, whether related to nuclear safety, physical protection, nuclear proliferation or sustainable development. Australia will continue to provide technical, financial and political support for Director General Amano's efforts to strengthen the Agency's contribution to the promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to the cause of international peace and security.

Australia is pleased to sponsor and support the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA (A/66/L.6).

Mr. Hermoso (Philippines): At the outset, the Philippines would like to welcome the newest member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Lao People's Democratic Republic — a fellow member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The Philippines welcomes the report of His Excellency Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the IAEA, and recognizes the importance of the Agency. At the same time, the Philippines reaffirms its strong support for the crucial role of the IAEA in assisting its member States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the transfer of technology to developing countries and facilitating nuclear knowledge sharing, as well as in nuclear safety, verification and security.

The events of the past year presented significant challenges to the work of the IAEA. The Fukushima nuclear accident shook the international community's perceptions of nuclear power, including the safety of existing power plants and proposed new facilities. More important, it compelled a number of countries, including the Philippines, to rethink their respective national positions on nuclear power.

However, as oil prices have continued to soar and concerns over climate change persist, the interest in nuclear power remains, and countries continue to turn to the IAEA for assistance in the development or expansion of their nuclear power programmes. The IAEA is uniquely placed to respond to the requests of its member States for assistance in the development of a safety infrastructure for nuclear power programmes, while also promoting international cooperation in nuclear safety. The Philippines believes that the IAEA should continue to provide assistance to countries, such as ours, that are still considering the inclusion of nuclear power in their energy mix, particularly in the development of a regulatory framework, capacity building and the management of radioactive waste.

In that regard, the Philippines supports the IAEA's central role in the area of nuclear safety and welcomes the adoption of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which will serve as a building block for the development of more targeted measures for enhancing nuclear safety worldwide.

Through its cooperation with the IAEA, the Philippines has been developing the necessary human resources and physical infrastructure in order to use nuclear technologies to help meet the challenges that many of us face today. On human health, the Philippines' standing request to be part of the Agency's Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT) was finally approved for implementation this year. An integrated review in connection with PACT, also known as an imPACT mission, was undertaken in the Philippines in March and enabled our health authorities to assess the National Cancer Action Plan and identify areas for improvement.

The Philippines will also be part of a network of regional training centres on cancer control and radiotherapy, which will enable it to enhance the capacities of its health professionals working in the area of cancer control and treatment, particularly those in the provinces. On behalf of the Group of 77 and China, the Philippines has introduced resolutions on PACT, on the staffing of the Agency's secretariat and on women in the secretariat.

In the field of nuclear medicine, the Philippines has established a radioisotope laboratory with the assistance of the Agency. We expect that this facility will lower the costs of nuclear medicine procedures in my country.

In the area of the environment, we welcome the Director General's focus this year on the Agency's work on issues related to water. As a pilot country for the IAEA Water Availability Enhancement Project, the Philippines is developing sustainable and socially responsible water resources management plans. In April, the Philippines hosted a national workshop, which produced a report analysing the country's

capacity to conduct comprehensive water resource assessments and developed a road map to address gaps in hydrological data and information.

Furthermore, in 2010, the Philippines was redesignated as an IAEA Collaborating Centre on the application of nuclear techniques in the study of harmful algal blooms.

The IAEA has continued to play an important role in helping countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals through its Technical Cooperation Programme and its various activities in the area of nuclear applications. We acknowledge the significant contribution of projects supported by the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme, especially in the areas of health and nutrition, environmental resource management and agricultural and industrial productivity.

Concerns persist about nuclear terrorism and the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. The Philippines reaffirms the importance of strengthening the Agency's activities in response to those threats. For its part, the Philippines is committed to strengthening the security of the nuclear and radioactive materials that are used for peaceful purposes and to preventing the illicit trafficking of such materials.

That commitment is embodied in our National Nuclear Security Plan, which was finalized in cooperation with the IAEA. The symbolic commissioning ceremony of the Megaports Initiative facilities at the port of Manila this year marked a milestone in our bilateral cooperation with the United States on nuclear security. Through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Philippines also works closely with Australia, the United States and our fellow Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members in securing radioactive sources in the region.

Another major challenge that continues to confront us is the increasing risk of nuclear proliferation. The Philippines reaffirms the importance of strengthening the Agency's nuclear verification capabilities and building confidence in the peaceful nature of all nuclear activities. The conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols will go a long way in efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.

The Philippines shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and strongly supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means of contributing to international peace and security. In our own region, ASEAN established the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. We welcome the progress in the discussions held in recent months with the nuclear-weapon States on their possible accession to the Treaty of Bangkok.

We also welcome the decision of the Director General to convene a forum to discuss the experiences of the five existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, which could be of possible relevance to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Philippines is committed to contributing to the success of the forum, which we believe will serve as an important confidence-building measure that will contribute to the realization of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as provided for in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)).

The IAEA has been successful in charting its way forward. Progress will not be easy, as political realities and financial constraints alike pose difficult hurdles for the Agency to overcome. The Philippines believes, however, that now is the time for IAEA member States to set aside all differences and to stand united in order to advance our common objectives.

Mr. Diallo (Senegal) (*spoke in French*): I am pleased to participate in this annual meeting, which affords the Assembly an opportunity to consider the vitally important activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

However, I must draw the IAEA secretariat's attention to the difficulties experienced by my delegation in being granted timely access to the report (see A/66/95) of the Director General. My delegation strongly regrets that situation and hopes that corrective measures will be taken in that regard.

Among the most pressing concerns of States, the dilemma posed by nuclear technology is one of the most widely shared and is undoubtedly one of the most difficult to address.

Indeed, while the many applications of nuclear energy, including in the areas of health, agriculture and

electricity generation, made it seem undeniably useful to many countries, its use has also created certain safety and security risks. In truth, the difficulties in managing nuclear risk are steadily increasing as a result of growing environmental hazards, as evidenced by the unfortunate nuclear accident that occurred in March in Fukushima, Japan. The accident finally convinced us of the need to improve nuclear safety and security measures by better adapting them to meet new challenges.

That realization undoubtedly inspired the IAEA Board of Governors to adopt an Action Plan on Nuclear Safety to improve the global nuclear safety framework. My delegation welcomes that valuable initiative and the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security, held on 22 September and convened by the Secretary-General. As it did on that occasion, Senegal reiterates the urgency of reviewing the rules and principles governing the application and monitoring of nuclear safety and security standards, so as to ensure greater transparency and accountability in the framework of appropriate procedures.

Drawing on our past experience, we must take all necessary measures to bolster nuclear safety and security, as well as to better prepare for emergencies and protect people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation and radiation risks. That is the only way that we will be able to restore confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The pursuit of the peaceful use of atomic energy should strictly take into account the need to protect human and environmental health.

Senegal highly values its scientific and technical cooperation with the IAEA, in particular in the areas of health and nutrition. That long history of cooperation has been enriched by many programmes, some of which I am pleased to mention: the application of the sterile insect technique, which has ensured that Senegalese research entities have come to serve as benchmarks in this field; our research programme on nutritional development for women has also been successful; and finally, the acquisition of a gamma camera, which is considered a major step forward in medical science.

Armed with that experience, we are in a good position to testify to the fact that the IAEA has also contributed to our country's advances in the areas of society and health. For that reason, we must always keep in mind that positive accomplishments in the laudable and difficult matters before the Agency, especially relating to verification, cooperation and the provision of assistance, call for our unwavering support.

My delegation is also convinced that the IAEA will remain an institution worthy of our efforts, which must be strengthened and appropriately resourced in order to implement its mandate.

Mr. Guerber (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): Switzerland would like to focus its remarks on what, in our view, was the key issue before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in recent months, namely, the nuclear accident at Fukushima.

As that event demonstrated, such disasters have transboundary and multidimensional consequences, and should therefore be managed with a global approach. Switzerland therefore welcomes the adoption at the fifty-fifth session of the General Conference of the IAEA in September of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Switzerland believes that, by its very nature, the IAEA must assume the leading role in coordinating the international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety.

Switzerland was actively involved in the negotiation process of the Action Plan and, like a number of States, has expressed regrets about the relatively modest ambitions contained in the final document as adopted. However, we consider the Action Plan as a first step in a process that should lead to less voluntary commitments from member States in the field of nuclear safety.

Switzerland therefore welcomes the speedy establishment by the IAEA Director General of a Nuclear Safety Action Team to coordinate the implementation of the Action Plan. Similarly, we welcome the commitment made by the IAEA Director General to inform member States on progress made in implementing the Action Plan. Switzerland also encourages all IAEA member States to fulfil their obligations related to the implementation of the Action Plan at the national level.

Switzerland will remain fully committed in this area, with a view to creating a nuclear safety regime so that we can assure our societies that the development of civilian nuclear energy will not act as a sword of Damocles constantly hanging over their heads.

Mr. Kodama (Japan): Let me begin by thanking the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Yukiya Amano, for presenting the annual report (see A/66/95) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March was triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake and its resulting tsunamis. The accident caused grave damage to Japan and its people. Japan is now moving forward to overcome that tragic event. I would like to take this opportunity once again to extend our deepest appreciation to all of the Member States, the IAEA and all other organizations that have rendered their support, for their assistance and solidarity.

I would also like to express our appreciation for the leadership demonstrated by Director General Amano and the continuous efforts made by the IAEA since the accident. Those efforts include supporting the provision of information about the accident; dispatching a number of teams, experts and international missions to the area; and adopting the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

Thanks to that invaluable support, the situation at the plant is moving steadily towards restoration. We are planning to move up the existing target date and will endeavour to achieve cold shutdown by the end of the year. In that regard, Japan will continue to work closely with partners around the world, and in particular with the IAEA, to make the most of all available international expertise. For instance, Japan will host a high-level conference with the IAEA in 2012. Through that initiative, we intend to share with the international community the results of our comprehensive review on nuclear power plants and the future direction of nuclear safety measures.

The IAEA has also played an instrumental role in ensuring the success of the United Nations high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security. Both Prime Minister Noda and Foreign Minister Gemba participated in the meeting and expressed Japan's resolve not only to overcome its own challenges but also to share with the international community lessons learned from the accident at Fukushima. The conference demonstrated the central and indispensable role of the IAEA in consolidating international efforts to enhance nuclear safety throughout the international community.

The IAEA is the only international organization with expertise in all aspects of nuclear energy, and not only in the areas of nuclear safety and security. We must not relax our efforts to support such roles on the part of the IAEA. On 21 September, Japan convened here in New York the third ministerial meeting of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a group consisting of 10 non-nuclear-weapon States. At the meeting, the ministers issued a joint statement expressing members' strong support for steps to further advance the implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Japan will continue to lead international efforts towards a world without nuclear weapons.

The North Korean nuclear issue constitutes a threat to peace and security in East Asia and to the international community as a whole and poses a serious challenge to the regime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The North Korean uranium enrichment programme is a clear violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the joint statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. It is important for the international community to continue to strongly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and related programmes, as stipulated in the relevant Security Council resolutions. In that regard, Japan welcomes the comprehensive report on the North Korean nuclear issue that the IAEA Director General submitted to the Board of Governors at its September meeting.

With regard to the Iranian nuclear issue, it is indispensable for the Islamic Republic of Iran to take action to alleviate all suspicions and win the confidence of the international community. While Japan notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran invited the IAEA to visit its facilities in August, we remain seriously concerned that it continues to engage in uranium enrichment activities. In that regard, Japan supports the efforts of the Director General to conduct discussions with Iran, as well as the dedicated activities of the Agency to resolve the Iran nuclear issue. Japan will continue to act in concert with the international community to find a peaceful and diplomatic settlement of this issue.

Japan highly appreciates the efforts made by Director General Amano towards the holding of the forum on the exchange of experiences of possible

relevance to the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East scheduled for November, which I expect will contribute significantly to the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

Showing support for the non-proliferation efforts of other member States and of the IAEA continues to be a priority for Japan. Japan has hosted the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation and has provided cooperation for IAEA activities designed to promote the entry into force of additional protocols. On 31 May, Japan also co-organized with Poland and Turkey a seminar in New York to discuss the effective implementation of the Security Council resolutions on non-proliferation. We believe that it is imperative that States Members of the United Nations continue to be engaged in this matter. Japan therefore plans to organize a second such meeting in New York next December.

The IAEA's continuing efforts to utilize nuclear technologies to develop solutions for global issues, such as water shortages and lack of access to cancer therapies in developing countries, are highly appreciated by member States. In that connection, Japan welcomes the IAEA initiative to raise awareness within the wider United Nations community through the briefing it organized in New York in September immediately preceding the Science Forum held in Vienna.

To ensure a safer nuclear future, the training of nuclear experts to underpin such a vision is essential. To that end, Japan established a nuclear human resource development network last November. Through such efforts, Japan will cooperate with the IAEA to nurture capable experts.

Despite the tragic events that befell Japan this March, I am convinced that, through the resilience of our people and assisted by the generous support of our partners in the international community, including the IAEA, we will overcome the challenge those events have presented. I am equally confident that we will find a path towards a safer nuclear future, benefiting from the lessons learned in this instance and the accumulated wisdom of the world in this field.

Mrs. Aitimova (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan wishes to congratulate Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his comprehensive report (see A/66/95), and in that connection, we are pleased to sponsor draft resolution A/66/L.6. As a member of the Agency, Kazakhstan is proud of its record of collaboration with the IAEA and will continue to strengthen that productive partnership.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev, speaking at the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security convened by the Secretary-General on 22 September 2011, aptly summarized the IAEA's responsibility by saying that it must protect humankind from nuclear weapons, counter potential nuclear terrorism, ensure the safety of nuclear power and advance human betterment through peaceful purposes.

He also said that it was important, in order to achieve those ends, to bring international legal norms into line with the reality of the existence of de facto nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, the greatest risks are associated with States that are involved in the black market in nuclear technologies, hence the importance of credible compliance by States parties with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We have to improve global mechanisms for managing processes in the development of nuclear power and the safety of nuclear facilities.

President Nazarbayev also proposed conducting regular stress tests of nuclear plants and protections systems and developing rapid rescue responses under the auspices of the IAEA.

My country is a major producer of uranium ore and has the fuel fabrication capability to further expand the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the framework of IAEA safeguards. Kazakhstan collaborates with the Russian Federation to make its uranium available for enrichment at the National Nuclear Centre in Angarsk, Siberia, for use as nuclear fuel in power reactors, and on developing the Kurchatov Nuclear Technology Park under IAEA surveillance.

My delegation supports the IAEA initiative to develop a new non-political and non-discriminatory framework for utilizing nuclear energy based on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and available to all member States complying with safeguards. In that way, no State should have to surrender its rights under the NPT.

Kazakhstan has officially confirmed to the Agency its offer to host an IAEA nuclear fuel bank for countries unable to acquire nuclear fuel supplies in the market. As soon as the exact site in my country has been determined, steps will be taken to establish the bank. In addition, our national atomic energy company, Kazatomprom, is in the process of creating a vertically integrated establishment with a complete nuclear fuel cycle in compliance with IAEA standards.

The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, the Treaty for which was signed in Semipalatinsk, is an additional contribution to our region, and Kazakhstan strictly and transparently abides by the IAEA safeguards agreement and additional protocol in order to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism and smuggling of nuclear weapons and radioactive materials.

As current Chair of the Ministerial Council of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and in its national capacity, Kazakhstan supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a solution that supports peace in the region. Working together with the facilitator, we commend the work of the IAEA on the 2012 conference on this issue.

We are implementing in a consistent manner the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), in order to strengthen measures aimed at combating illegal trafficking in nuclear and other materials. In September, with the support of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, we hosted a Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) training workshop for 30 experts from the Central Asian region, funded by the Governments of Norway and the United States of America. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, Kazakhstan maintains the strictest control over its equipment and installations that enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

In view of the growing importance of nuclear energy, Kazakhstan has entered into an agreement with the IAEA on technical cooperation for 2010-2015 to develop nuclear energy for nuclear education, medicine and agriculture, research reactor safety, nuclear technology, radioisotope and radiation applications for collective global human security.

An issue of concern to us is that Kazakhstan, though a key and responsible member of the IAEA, is being denied the opportunity to participate in the work of elective bodies because of the rules of procedure currently in place. Kazakhstan fully supports the early entry into force of the amendments to article VI of the IAEA Statute, and we are confident that a solution will be found. I would like to state that Kazakhstan contributes regularly to the IAEA budget, as well as to the Technical Cooperation Fund.

To conclude, we extend our full support to the Director General in every area of the Agency's mandate to address global issues of nuclear technology.

Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian delegation would like to express its appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Yukiya Amano, for his presentation of the report of the Agency (see A/66/95).

Russia greatly values the IAEA's work in improving and strengthening the global non-proliferation regime, and in ensuring wide and safe uses of nuclear energy. The Agency contributes significantly to solving problems in the areas of reliable energy supplies, combating global climate change and promoting health and well-being around the world. It is also important that the IAEA continue to increase its efforts to broaden international cooperation in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With regard to the IAEA's activities, we should not omit to note the unique nature of its verification mechanism, which enables extremely effective monitoring of States' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We believe it is important that the Agency continue to expand its oversight capabilities, including through acceptance of its safeguards agreements and their additional protocols, as the generally recognized standards of verification of Governments' compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

Russia is an active participant as a financial donor in projects aimed at strengthening the IAEA's safeguards system, including by providing funding for implementing national programmes of scientific and technical support for the Agency's safety activities. We wholeheartedly support the IAEA's efforts in the area of technical cooperation and the provision of

appropriate assistance to developing countries. One such example of international cooperation that was conducted successfully under the Agency's auspices was the completion of an international IAEA project on innovative reactors and the nuclear fuel cycle, which Russia initiated. We are supporting the efforts of the IAEA secretariat in financing the project's budget, and we call on all countries taking part in the project to help provide direct financing for it as shareholders. The Russian Federation made the decision to provide long-term funding for the project for the period 2008 to 2012 in the amount of Rub 23 million annually.

With regard to the large-scale development of nuclear energy, the Russian Federation is prioritizing the following efforts: developing a new architecture for peaceful nuclear cooperation based on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, guaranteeing the provision of services related to the nuclear fuel cycle, and finding solutions for issues relating to spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Based on those priorities, Russia has launched an initiative for the development of a global nuclear energy infrastructure and the establishment of international centres for the provision of nuclear-fuel-cycle services.

We note with satisfaction that this initiative has proved to be needed, and has genuinely contributed to resolving issues in providing unhindered access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for all States parties to the NPT while complying in good faith with their non-proliferation obligations. In practice it gives States the ability to take advantage of nuclear energy and meet their needs for nuclear fuel without incurring high costs or the security risks relating to the proliferation of components of the nuclear fuel cycle. In connection with that initiative we have, jointly with Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Armenia, established in Russia an international centre for enriched uranium, in which all States are invited to participate in developing nuclear power in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

Another important step in creating a global nuclear energy infrastructure has been the creation in Russia of guaranteed reserves of low-enriched uranium under IAEA administration. It is already fully operational and can be used by States members of the Agency complying with their non-proliferation obligations.

We firmly believe that it is essential that we learn the lessons of the situation resulting from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi 1 nuclear power plant in order to prevent its being repeated in the future. A thorough and professional analysis of the reasons and evolution of the accident and its results should be conducted under the auspices of the IAEA in its central role as the sole international organization possessing the necessary experience and authority. We welcome the results of the sessions of the IAEA's June ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety concerning the power plant accident in Japan, and the participants' joint declaration affirming the necessity of improving the international legal framework, as well as technological and organizational aspects of nuclear safety. The declaration echoes the proposals of the President of the Russian Federation concerning the elimination of discrepancies in the relevant international legal documents, such as addenda to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. Furthermore, Russia has also introduced proposals for improving the IAEA's safety standards. We believe that our initiatives will receive broad support and will be carried out.

With regard to regional non-proliferation challenges, we commend the IAEA's practical contribution to the multilateral search for ways of solving them. We will provide appropriate support to the Agency in its efforts to implement the relevant safeguards agreements in Iran and Syria and make use of its expertise in order to establish a reliably functioning nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia sees no alternative to political and diplomatic solutions to the situation concerning the nuclear programmes in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In conclusion, I would like to affirm our support for the draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/66/L.6). As a sponsor, Russia fully agrees with the importance of the Agency's work and is convinced that the Agency will continue to work towards the strengthening of international security and solving the problems of a reliable energy source.

Ms. Kolontai (Belarus) (*spoke in Russian*): Belarus attaches great importance to the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the leading international body working in the nuclear area, and welcomes the report of the Director General of the Agency, Mr. Yukiya Amano.

As a founding member State of the Agency, Belarus feels that it has a vested interest in the IAEA's active work in fostering the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy and does all that it can to contribute to attaining those aims. We consider that the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme is an important tool for the Agency in achieving those aims. In accordance with the structure of Belarus's programme for 2008-2013, the basic priorities of our country's technical cooperation, conducted jointly with the IAEA, are the development of a national nuclear energy infrastructure, the use of nuclear technologies in health care and the restoration of areas afflicted as a result of the Chernobyl atomic power plant accident.

In 2008, the Republic of Belarus made the decision to launch a national nuclear power programme. The preparations for building an atomic power station are being implemented in close coordination with the Agency. Belarus will soon embark on the practical phase of construction of the power station. In realizing this complicated project, Belarus will continue to comply firmly and rigorously with its international nuclear obligations and to abide by international security norms and standards. In order to complete the nuclear power plant project, we in Belarus are developing the necessary infrastructure, preparing legal framework and actively training personnel. That work is being carried out in a thorough and transparent manner by drawing on the expertise of the IAEA, as well as on that of other States with broad experience in the sphere of nuclear energy. The Technical Assistance Programme of the IAEA is also playing an important role in this process.

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident and the recent tragic events following the powerful earthquake in Japan underscore the urgency of strengthening the regimes for nuclear and radiological safety. For Belarus, nuclear safety is not a theoretical concept. We consider the matter of nuclear safety an undisputed priority. That approach is written into our national laws and built into our current practice. Together with the IAEA, Belarus is working to ensure nuclear safety.

As an example of that cooperation, we are beginning to implement an integrated plan that provides for physical nuclear safety in the Republic of Belarus. The implementation of that plan would be an exemplary contribution on the part of Belarus towards developing an international regime for physical nuclear safety. However, we do not plan to stop there in our cooperation activities aimed at ensuring nuclear safety.

Today, we face the challenge of re-establishing trust in nuclear energy, which without a doubt requires solutions that will enable us to raise the quality of nuclear safety to a higher level. That aim can be achieved only if we work closely with IAEA member States and other organizations and partners through effective coordination of our efforts in a sustained spirit of transparency and cooperation. We are convinced that IAEA should continue to play a leadership role in the process of reforming its international nuclear safety regime and reaction mechanisms to deal with abnormal nuclear situations.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

United Nations A/66/PV.47

General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session

Official Records

47th plenary meeting
Tuesday, 1 November 2011, 3 p.m.
New York

President: Mr. Al-Nasser ..... (Qatar)

In the absence of the President, Mr. Thomson (Fiji), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Agenda item 115 (*continued*)

Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other appointments

(g) Appointment of members of the Joint Inspection Unit

Note by the Secretary-General (A/66/509)

The Acting President: A note by the Secretary-General, which has been circulated as document A/66/509, informs of the resignation of Inspector Enrique Román-Morey of Peru, effective as of 31 October 2011. Inspector Román-Morey was appointed by the General Assembly on 9 October 2007 for a five-year term of office, beginning on 1 January 2008 and expiring on 31 December 2012. In accordance with article 4, paragraph 5, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, the Chairperson of the Unit notified the Secretary-General, on 6 September, of the vacancy and of his decision to waive the requirement of six months' notice, stipulated in article 4, paragraph 3, of the statute. As a result of the resignation of Inspector Enrique Román-Morey of Peru, the General Assembly is required, during the sixty-sixth session, to appoint a member to fill the vacancy in the Joint Inspection Unit.

It is further stated in the note of the Secretary-General that, in order for consultations to be held as stipulated in article 3, and to align the term of office with that of the other inspectors, the Assembly may wish to consider filling the vacancy for a term of office beginning on 1 January 2012 and expiring on 31 December 2016.

In that connection, may I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to fill this vacancy for a term of office beginning on 1 January 2012 and expiring on 31 December 2016?

It was so decided.

The Acting President: As also indicated in document A/66/509, in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, the President of the General Assembly shall consult with Member States to draw up a list of countries — in this case, one country — that would be requested to propose a candidate for appointment to the Joint Inspection Unit.

After holding the necessary consultations, I should like to communicate to the Assembly that five countries, namely, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico and Peru, have decided to present their candidatures for the one vacancy from among the Latin American and Caribbean States.

Since, from among the Latin American and Caribbean States, there is no single endorsed candidate for the one vacancy, I should like, in accordance with past practice, to consult with Member States through

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the procedure of holding an advisory vote by secret ballots, to select one country from among the Latin American and Caribbean States to be requested to propose a candidate for appointment to the Joint Inspection Unit.

Although this advisory vote is not an election, we shall follow the rules of procedure of the Assembly governing elections. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the General Assembly agrees to that procedure?

It was so decided.

The Acting President: In accordance with existing practice, the country receiving the greatest number of votes, and not less than a majority of the votes of those present and voting, shall be the country selected to propose a candidate for appointment to the Joint Inspection Unit.

Also, consistent with past practice, in the event that, owing to a tie vote, it becomes necessary to determine the candidate to be elected, there will be a special restricted ballot limited to those candidates who have obtained an equal number of votes.

May I also take it that the General Assembly agrees to those procedures?

It was so decided.

The Acting President: May I remind members that the Assembly is not appointing members to the Joint Inspection Unit at this time. It is only selecting one country, which will be requested to propose a candidate. Therefore, only the name of a country, and not the name of an individual, should appear on the ballot paper.

The Assembly will now proceed to the selection of one country from among the Latin American and Caribbean States, which will be requested to propose a candidate to fill the vacancy in the Joint Inspection Unit.

Before we begin the voting process, I should like to remind members that, pursuant to rule 88 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order on the actual conduct of the voting.

We shall now begin the voting process. Members are requested to remain seated until all ballots have been collected.

Ballot papers will now be distributed. May I request representatives to write on the ballot paper the name of the one State for which they wish to vote. Ballot papers containing more than one name will be declared invalid. If a ballot paper contains the name of a Member State that does not belong to the Latin American and Caribbean region, that ballot paper will be declared invalid. Ballot papers bearing the name of an individual will not be counted at all.

At the invitation of the President, Ms. Anna Ruski (Bulgaria), Mr. Juan Pablo Espinoza (Chile), Ms. Anna Reich (Hungary), Mr. Amin Javed Faizal (Maldives), Mrs. Jamila Alaoui (Morocco) and Ms. Caroline Payne (United Kingdom) acted as tellers.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

The meeting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 3.50 p.m.

The Acting President: The result of the voting is as follows:

Latin American and Caribbean States	
Number of ballot papers:	175
Number of invalid ballots:	2
Number of valid ballots:	173
Abstentions:	0
Number of members voting	173
Required majority:	87
Number of votes obtained:	
Honduras	107
Haiti	26
Peru	17
Mexico	12
Plurinational State of Bolivia	11

Having obtained the required majority and the greatest number of votes, Honduras was selected to propose a candidate for appointment to the Joint Inspection Unit.

The Acting President: In accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, Honduras will be requested to submit the name of a candidate and his or her curriculum vitae highlighting the candidate's relevant qualifications for the tasks ahead.

I would like to remind members that, in accordance with resolution 59/267, of 23 December 2004, the candidate should have experience in at least

one of the following fields: oversight, audit, inspection, investigation, evaluation, finance, project evaluation, programme evaluation, human resources management, management, public administration, monitoring and/or programme performance, as well as knowledge of the United Nations system and its role in international relations.

After holding the appropriate consultations described in article 3, paragraph 2, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, including consultations with the President of the Economic and Social Council and with the Secretary-General in his capacity as Chairman of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, the President of the General Assembly will propose the name of the candidate to the Assembly for appointment to the Joint Inspection Unit.

We have thus concluded this stage of our consideration of sub-item (g) of agenda item 115.

Agenda item 75 (*continued*)

Report of the International Criminal Court

Note by the Secretary-General (A/66/309)

Report of the Secretary-General (A/66/333)

The Acting President: Members will recall that the General Assembly considered this item at its 44th plenary meeting on 26 October 2011. We shall now hear the remaining speakers.

Mr. Silva (Brazil): I join others in thanking the President of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Judge Sang-Hyun Song, for his statement last week (see A/66/PV.44) and for the presentation of the seventh report of the Court to the General Assembly (see A/66/309). I commend him and the other judges of the Court on their decisive role in contributing to the rule of law and to the cause of justice. We are proud to have contributed to this process through the work of Judge Sylvia Steiner, a Brazilian national.

Brazil attaches great importance to the development of international law provided by the Rome Statute, which established the first permanent, treaty-based court to try individuals accused of having committed the most serious crimes of international concern. The independence of such an important judicial institution is the foundation of its legitimacy in bringing accused persons to justice, with fairness and with full respect for their rights. Brazil believes that the values enshrined in the preamble of the Rome Statute are truly universal in nature. That is why we have always been supporters of the Court's universality.

In that regard, we note with satisfaction that, during the period covered by the report, Grenada, the Republic of Moldova, Saint Lucia, Seychelles and Tunisia deposited their instruments of ratification or accession. Since that time, Tunisia, Maldives and Cape Verde, a member of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, have joined the Court, bringing the total number of States parties to the Rome Statute to 119 countries. We warmly welcome all of them. We hope that more States, large and small, on all continents, will ratify the Rome Statute in the near future. In South America, as is well known, all countries are parties to the ICC and are strong supporters of the Court's contribution to the cause of international justice.

The period covered by the report shows that the Court is currently facing an unprecedented workload. The ICC is now seized of seven open situations, given the fact that Pre-Trial Chamber III recently authorized yet another investigation. The number of individuals subject to proceedings before the Court increased from 15 to 25 persons. In that context, it is important that the Court be granted all the necessary means for the timely discharge of its judicial functions.

Brazil continues to stress the importance of cooperation between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations. We attach particular importance to efforts aimed at reinforcing rule of law activities, such as those that support the domestic capacity of States to prosecute serious crimes. States have a sovereign responsibility to deliver justice and promote law enforcement. They must be supported in their efforts to reinforce their national institutions, so that the Court can function as a court of last resort.

The next Assembly of States Parties will be particularly busy, as elections will be involved. In less than two months, that Assembly will elect six new judges and a new prosecutor. Brazil wishes them every success in the discharge of their duties. I would like to express, once again, Brazil's full support to the ICC and our appreciation to President Sang-Hyun Song.

Mr. Kamau (Kenya): Kenya wishes to align itself with the statement made by the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania on

behalf of the African States Parties to the Rome Statute.

My delegation appreciates the report of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on its activities for the period 2010-2011 (see A/66/309), which highlights some of the developments since the previous report (see A/65/313). We note the increased workload of the Court and the concomitant challenges, which call for increased efforts to ensure that the Court remains effective in the execution of its mandate. We commend the President of the Court, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, for his leadership in steering the Court towards realizing the objectives for which it was established.

In that regard, Kenya believes that the Court has indeed staked out an important role for itself in helping the world fight impunity for perpetrators of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crimes of aggression.

Kenya remains committed to its obligations under the Rome Statute and under the rule of law and natural justice. Furthermore, the Government of Kenya has continued to cooperate with the Court, as well as to facilitate its work. Most recently, the Court opened a liaison office in Kenya, and the Government has granted that office, along with its officers, full diplomatic privileges and immunities.

As we facilitate the Court's work in Kenya, we are of course deeply aware that it is the primary responsibility of Kenya to exercise criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for crimes committed in Kenya, including during the post-election violence of 2008. The Government has made commendable progress in the process of investigating and prosecuting all those suspected of involvement in the post-election violence. Indeed, under Kenya's new Constitution, extensive reforms within the justice system have been undertaken to ensure the fair and transparent administration of justice for all. Some of those reforms include the appointment of a new chief justice, attorney general and deputy chief justice, along with the first-ever Supreme Court judges, 28 new high court judges and a new director of public prosecutions — all of whom were recruited through a rigorous and transparent public recruitment process. The systematic restructuring of the police force is ongoing and will receive its final form under the national police service bill of 2011, once it becomes law.

Equally important, the political institutions of the executive and Parliament will also undergo restructuring to ensure an improved enabling environment for the administration of justice and the protection of human rights.

Kenya believes in the rule of law at the national and international levels and considers the Rome Statute to be an instrument for further institutionalizing the rule of law and fighting impunity. We therefore encourage States that are not parties to the Statute, particularly those on the Security Council, which is entrusted with the role of making referrals under article 13 and 15 ter and deferrals under article 16 of the Statute, to become States parties. That would bind them by the same principles as those over which they wish to adjudicate and on which they wish to pronounce themselves within the Security Council. The moral imperative of that point, as well as the corresponding jurisprudential contradiction, ought to be self-evident.

Kenya joins other Member States in applauding the States that have ratified the Rome Statute since the last report, bringing the number from 111 to 119.

Maintaining public confidence in any justice system depends on the ability of that system to uphold the rule of law and the principles of natural justice. Those are fundamental elements that are enshrined in the spirit and the letter of the Rome Statute in order to ensure that justice is not only done, but that it is manifestly also seen to be done.

Unfortunately, there is a growing perception that the Court is unfairly and selectively targeting certain countries, particularly in Africa. There is also a perception that ownership of the Rome Statute has been usurped, as if to suggest that the Statute and the Court are meant to serve some States and not others. Such perceptions undermine an institution that was created with very noble intentions, and threatens to erode all confidence in the Court. When we fight impunity and promote the rule of law at the international level, we should not substitute impunity at the national level with impunity and high-handedness at the international level through selective and prejudicial application of the principles and articles of the Rome Statute. The Court needs therefore to candidly inquire why some States parties continue to be disgruntled and alienated within the ICC. That process should be followed by the institution of actions

that will ensure respect for the rule of law and the principles of natural justice as enshrined in the spirit and letter of the Rome Statute.

Let me conclude by stating that the social fabric of our international order is based, among other things, on the principles of sovereignty and the equality of States, on the immunity of officials that exists under customary international law and on the peaceful coexistence among States. Those fundamental principles should not only guide the work of the Court in relation to States but should also do so with respect to the role of the Security Council, as provided under the Rome Statute.

As we continue the process of identifying the next prosecutor of the Court, we look forward to seeing a prosecutor who will work with the Court to ensure that those fundamental legal outcomes and legal doctrines are upheld in the application of the Rome Statute.

Mr. Loy (United States of America): Before I begin, I would like to express my country's profound condolence to the people of Italy on the death of Judge Antonio Cassese, an eminent scholar and jurist, who made a lasting contribution to international criminal law. We would also like to thank President Sang-Hyum Song for his report (see A/66/333) and for his service to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Although the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, we remain steadfastly committed to promoting the rule of law and to the principle that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law should be held to account. We will continue to play a leadership role in righting those wrongs when they have been committed and, in concert with the international community, acting on early warning signs to prevent atrocities from occurring in the first place. We recognize that the International Criminal Court plays a key role in bringing perpetrators of the worst atrocities to justice.

We were pleased to cast our first vote in favour of an ICC referral by the Security Council earlier this year, which reflects our continued engagement with the ICC and States parties to the Rome Statute to end impunity for the worst crimes. Just as we are engaging with the States parties on issues of concern, the Obama Administration also supports the ICC's prosecution of those cases that advance United States interests and values, consistent with the requirements of United States law.

We continue to support positive complementarity initiatives by assisting countries in their efforts to develop domestic accountability processes for Rome Statute crimes. The ICC, by its nature, is intended to examine only those accused of bearing the greatest responsibility for the gravest crimes within its jurisdiction. It depends on States to complement the work of the ICC with national-level prosecutions.

In that regard, over the past year, we supported the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to draft legislation establishing specialized mixed courts. We will continue to assist efforts to strengthen the capacity and the independence of the Congolese judicial system in order to achieve justice for the victims of sexual violence and other grave crimes. We supported a pilot project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to protect witnesses and judicial officers in sensitive and challenging cases, and are expanding that kind of witness-protection support. We are looking for additional ways to support domestic prosecutions in other countries.

Despite the good work that has already been done, important challenges remain. In particular, reparations and coordinated and effective witness and judicial protection remain key gaps that must be filled. Finally, my delegation's concerns about the amendments adopted last year in Kampala are well known, and were set forth in last year's debate on this agenda item. (see A/65/PV.41, p. 26)

The United States looks forward to continuing its participation as an observer at meetings of the Assembly of States Parties at the upcoming session in New York this December.

Mr. Delgado Sánchez (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Cuba takes note of the report of the International Criminal Court contained in document A/66/309. The establishment of an impartial, non-selective, effective and fair international criminal jurisdiction that is complementary to national justice systems and genuinely independent, and therefore free of subjugation to political interests that could distort its essence, continues to be an objective that Cuba supports.

However, given the limitations to its independence, the International Criminal Court was

tainted from the outset owing to how its relationship with the Security Council was defined. Article 16 of the Rome Statute authorizes the Security Council to suspend investigations or prosecutions carried out by the Court. That provision remains the case, despite the outcome of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, held in Kampala in 2010.

The referral of the case of Libya to the International Criminal Court by the Security Council revealed once again a negative trend that Cuba has repeatedly condemned. The Security Council, in violation of the principles of international law and treaty law, continues to refer cases to the International Criminal Court that involve facts and citizens of States that are not party to the Rome Statute.

The very resolutions of the Security Council are proof of that organ's policy of double standards, since those very resolutions stipulate that crimes committed by the forces of Powers that are members of the Council and not party to the Rome Statute cannot be investigated. The Court cannot be a tool to attack developing countries and to provide impunity to developed countries with regard to their aggressions.

Such irresponsible conduct by the Security Council not only affects the supposed impartiality and independence that should be a hallmark of the International Criminal Court. It also threatens the legitimacy of the undemocratic and unrepresentative decisions of the Security Council. At that rate, we will soon be talking of reforming not only the Security Council but also the International Criminal Court and its Statute.

We would like to reiterate our concern about the serious precedent set by the decisions of the Court to initiate proceedings against nationals of States non-parties to the Rome Statute, States that have not even accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to article 12 of its Statute. The Cuban delegation reiterates that the legal principle regarding a State's consent to be bound by a treaty, as provided for in article 11 of part II of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of 23 May 1969, must be respected.

As a complement to national criminal jurisdictions, the integrity of the International Criminal Court must be preserved. The Court must remain impartial and fully independent of the political bodies of the United Nations, in particular those that are undemocratic and unrepresentative in their work. Such bodies should not hamper or affect its functioning. The responsibilities of the Security Council under the Charter should not limit the Court's role as an independent judicial body.

For more than 50 years, Cuba has been subjected to various forms of aggression, which, as a result of the unilateral and extraterritorial actions underlying that aggression, have caused thousands of deaths and injuries and incalculable material, economic and financial damage. The definition of the crime of aggression reached in Kampala is more limited that Cuba had hoped for. We missed the opportunity to establish a generic definition that would cover all the forms of aggression that are manifest in international relations among States. Such forms are not limited to the use of armed force, but include those that affect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States.

In conclusion, we reaffirm our resolve to contribute to the implementation of truly impartial international criminal law that respects the standards of international law, in particular the United Nations Charter.

Mr. Ulibarri (Costa Rica) (*spoke in Spanish*): Costa Rica is grateful for the detailed and comprehensive report submitted by the President of the International Criminal Court, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, whose leadership and vision we acknowledge (see A/66/309). We reiterate our support for the Court as an essential component of the architecture of international law, in particular as an essential institution in fighting impunity for the worst crimes against humanity.

As the Court approaches its tenth anniversary next year, we are pleased to see an increasing number of States adhering to, and ratifying, the Rome Statute.

The report submitted by President Song, which covers the period from 1 August 2010 to 31 July 2011, indicates that five States ratified the Rome Statute during the period: Grenada, the Republic of Moldova, Saint Lucia, Seychelles and Tunisia. Subsequently, the Philippines, Maldives and Cape Verde also ratified it. We welcome them all and are pleased that 119 States have now joined the Court. While this figure is encouraging, it also makes clear how much remains to be done in order for the universalization of the Court to be achieved. We call on those States that are not yet parties to the Rome Statute to accede to it as soon as possible, with a view to strengthening and promoting

the comprehensive character of international justice and, as a result, peace and human rights.

Costa Rica would like to address three specific aspects that are of particular interest to it with respect to the Court.

First, we share the concerns expressed by President Song regarding the lack of compliance on the part of certain States parties with the clear and irrecusable responsibilities that derive from the Rome Statute. It is particularly serious that this lack of compliance is reflected in the refusal to execute outstanding arrest warrants. There is no valid legal reason to persist in this type of conduct, and, even worse, in the challenge that is implied by hosting on the territory of any State party individuals who are the subjects of such arrest warrants.

We hope that the report on possible proceedings of the Assembly in relation with non-cooperation, which was adopted unanimously by the bureau, will help to address this major challenge. It is even more important, however, that States fully shoulder their responsibilities and that those States that are subordinating their commitments under the Rome Statute to other considerations change their attitude.

An additional source of concern is the financial situation of the Court and the possibility that, as a result of budgetary constraints, its important work could be jeopardized. The efforts of the Court have increased substantially during the period covered by the report, as is made clear therein, and will continue to increase in future. This is due to the gravity of the violations of human rights and of human dignity under consideration and also to the greater recognition accorded the essential character of the Court.

However, as its workload has increased, its budget has shrunk in real terms, and a number of important member States have insisted on the implementation of indiscriminate zero-growth policies that do not duly take into account the internal workings of the Court or the external challenges that it faces.

We hope that this issue will be considered at the next Assembly of States Parties, with patience, realism, goodwill and keeping in mind two key factors: the need for continuing improvements in the efficacy and efficiency of the work of the Court, and the commitment to invest in international justice, with the understanding that its benefits for peace, coexistence and human dignity vastly outweigh its costs.

The third element that my delegation wishes to address is cooperation between the Court and the United Nations, which is derived from two essential sources: article 10 of the Relationship Agreement between the two organizations, signed on 4 October 2004, and article 13 of the Rome Statute, on the exercise of powers by the Security Council. This cooperation has developed in a sound manner and has led to tangible achievements for both bodies that are linked to the central and shared objectives of the promotion of international justice, peace and human rights.

However, it is necessary to recall that any referral from the Council to the Court, significant as it may be, also implies unforeseen obligations. It would be fair, therefore, if the resulting costs were to be compensated by the United Nations — something that has not occurred to date. We trust that reasonable arrangements will be arrived at in this area as well.

At the next Assembly of States Parties, to be held in December, we will elect six judges and the successor to the Prosecutor. That will be a crucial time for the future of the Court. Our country is fully committed to shouldering, in a responsible and clear-thinking manner, our responsibilities with respect to these two processes and the work of the Court in general.

We would like to take this opportunity also to express appreciation for the leadership of and the impact made on the independence of the organization by Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, as well as by the President of the Assembly of States Parties, Ambassador Christian Wenaweser of Liechtenstein, whose mandate is also coming to an end, and we convey our gratitude to both. We also welcome the fact that Ambassador Tiina Intelmann of Estonia has been recommended by the Bureau to take the helm of the Assembly for the next three years.

We are certain that, with the contribution of all States parties of the United Nations and of responsible organizations representing civil society, we will move in the right direction and consolidate the gains made.

Mr. Troya (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): Allow me at the outset to convey the gratitude of the delegation of Ecuador for the presentation of the seventh annual report on the activities of the

International Criminal Court (ICC) (see A/66/309), which we received from the President. The report reflects the painstaking work done by that high Court to resolutely combat impunity, which, in the name of peace, can never be tolerated.

From the outset, Ecuador has been a strong supporter of the establishment and consolidation of the International Criminal Court, and we would like to take this opportunity to ratify our commitment to further strengthening the ICC and the Rome Statute as the sole mechanisms for the achievement of the implementation of an international criminal justice system. We welcome the inclusion of Maldives, the Philippines, Cape Verde, Grenada, the Republic of Moldova, Saint Lucia, Seychelles and Tunisia to the Rome Statute, which brings to 119 the number of countries that recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC.

Following the commitments that were made at the Kampala Review Conference, progress has been made in a number of areas that are key to the further strengthening of the Court. Fundamental concepts such as the universalization of the Statute, complementarity and cooperation between States and the Court, as well as support for victims and for affected communities, were the subject of discussion, with the active participation of my country's delegation, which attended the Conference.

However, Ecuador remains of the view that a great deal of ground remains to be covered and that much remains to be done in a number of areas that are of particular importance to my delegation. In particular, my delegation deems it indispensable that we ensure the independence and autonomy of the Court, gradually eliminating any political interference that may stem from any of the organs of the United Nations.

The consensus that was achieved at the Kampala Conference regarding the definition of the crime of aggression required significant sacrifices on the part of delegations such as my own, which had hoped for a clearer, more stringent article that would have prevented any future abuse of military power and flagrant violations of the sovereignty of States. As a result, we call for all necessary efforts to ensure that the provisions regarding the crime remain fully in force in 2017, without excuses or delays.

For Ecuador, the progressive universalization of the Rome Statute and of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is an objective that cannot be given up. Beyond immediate political considerations, it is indispensable that we progress towards the creation of authentic international criminal justice with jurisdiction to address even the most horrendous crimes and to punish the perpetrators regardless of their nationality, their position or their duties.

Article 80 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador confirms that there is no statute of limitations for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. We are currently in the process of aligning various bodies of our national legislation to the text and spirit of the Rome Statute, thus strengthening the prohibition of the crimes of torture, forced disappearance and summary executions, inter alia.

Moreover, timely and appropriate reparation for all victims of crimes that are submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is a substantial element of justice. Therefore my delegation welcomes the efforts to strengthen the Voluntary Fund for victim compensation, as well as the efforts of various entities and Governments in this regard.

The delegation of Ecuador fully supports the work of all working groups, particularly the search committee for the post of Prosecutor, whose efforts are fundamental for the future of the Court.

The Government of Ecuador has made consistent efforts to ensure that the International Criminal Court is equipped with the necessary funds to ensure its efficient functioning. There is no justification for allowing tasks of undoubted importance, such as protection of witnesses and victims, as well as the work of the Prosecutor, to be jeopardized as a result of insufficient funding.

We are on the threshold of a renewal process that will involve the judges and Prosecutor of the Court and the President and Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties. It is part of an enriching democratic exercise that merits the strongest support, a process that my country applauds and is following closely.

Allow me to conclude by affirming that the delegation of Ecuador echoes the call to maintain and strengthen a constructive and efficient relationship among the Court and the various organs of the United Nations. We are committed to strengthening the

institutionality of the Court. We believe that the effort is a joint undertaking in which we should participate in a constructive manner in order to achieve the goals we have set ourselves.

Mr. Falouh (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): My country participated in the Rome Conference that culminated in the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998. It also signed the Rome Statute.

The Rome Statute of the ICC was designed to end impunity for those who committed the crimes listed in the Statute, which reaffirms in its preamble

> "the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".

The preamble also emphasizes that

> "nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any State".

The Rome Statute reaffirms that the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked only when the national judicial system fails to use its jurisdiction. It also confirms that the main and primary jurisdiction of the national law is in realizing justice on its territories and in cases that are under its jurisdiction and mandate.

It is really disconcerting that the idea of international criminal justice is being used as a pretext to implement political agendas totally alien to well-known norms and rules of international law and the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It is also regrettable that some countries refer to my country, Syria, in their statements, using this rostrum, this item and this legal organ to turn the facts upside down, to level accusations and to present misrepresentations and falsifications. They use or misuse law and place it at the service of politics to serve their own logic for interfering in the internal affairs of States.

I do not believe that delegations that participated in the Rome Conference thought that the coveted codification of international criminal law would at some point be used in the service of political agendas. I believe they never thought then that the Rome Statute of the ICC would one day be used as a pretext to topple regimes or to interfere in the internal affairs of States. None of the jurists who participated in the drafting of the Statute ever thought that the idea of the definition of the crime of aggression would be diluted to serve the aggressor State, nor did they ever dream that certain States that commit crimes that come under the jurisdiction of the Court would be exempt from accountability and punishment and would be overlooked because of considerations that are completely contradictory to the principles of justice and equality.

We would have hoped that the Australian delegation would talk to us about the Iraqi women and children who emigrated and whose bodies were devoured by sharks, in full view of Australian ship crews in the Java Sea. We would have wished that they would tell us of justification for the situation of thousands of people in detention camps, in shanty towns established on the northern coast of Australia, lacking any medical care, because they are illegal immigrants.

My country has experienced unrest. The time available here will not permit me to discuss this in detail. My country has previously explained the circumstances surrounding the unrest, as well as the measures that the Syrian Government has taken to restore peace, stability and the rule of law in the areas marred by unrest.

We would, however, like to reaffirm once again that the Syrian Government is serious about implementing the promised reforms. Actually, it has already started implementing legal, legislative, judicial, social and political reforms. I would also like to stress that the Syrian authorities are undertaking their legal and judicial responsibilities in full in order to implement the law and bring to justice anyone who violates the law, regardless of their character or post.

The Independent Judicial Commission that has been established is fulfilling its mandate by referring anyone implicated in an illegal act to the national court system, so that the necessary legal measures can be taken while preserving all the rights of the accused and the victims at the various stages of court proceedings.

I sincerely call upon everyone to reread the provisions of the Charter and to revive the spirit of

those provisions in order to improve relations among States Members of the United Nations.

The Acting President: We have heard the last speaker in the debate on agenda item 75. The General Assembly has thus concluded this stage of its consideration of agenda item 75.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

United Nations A/66/PV.48

General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session

Official Records

48th plenary meeting
Wednesday, 2 November 2011, 10 a.m.
New York

President: Mr. Al-Nasser ..... (Qatar)

In the absence of the President, Ms. Kamara (Liberia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Agenda item 86 *(continued)*

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Note by the Secretary-General (A/66/95)

Draft resolution (A/66/L.6)

The Acting President: Members will recall that the Assembly considered item 86 at its 46th plenary meeting on 1 November. We shall now hear the remaining speakers.

Mr. Shin Dong Ik (Republic of Korea): At the outset, allow me to thank Director General Yukiya Amano for presenting the 2010 annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see A/66/95) and for his statement (see A/66/PV.46), which provides additional information on the past year's developments in the Agency's activities. I would also like to express our appreciation to the Director General and to the secretariat of the IAEA for their dedication and professionalism in carrying out the statutory mandates of the IAEA.

The IAEA plays a vital role in accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Those mandates are subject to ever-increasing demands and new challenges, ranging from the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism to nuclear safety, as shown by the Fukushima accident. To meet those challenges and demands, we are of the view that the IAEA should be equipped with the appropriate resources to maintain its capacity.

I would like to comment on several topics covered in the report that are important to my delegation, namely, safeguards and nuclear safety and security. The report shows that the international nuclear community maintained a high level of safe performance in 2010. The nuclear incident at Fukushima, however, sent an unmistakable signal to the international community that we cannot afford to remain complacent when it comes to nuclear safety. In that regard, we welcome the adoption, by this year's General Conference of the IAEA, of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which outlines practical measures to strengthen the global nuclear safety framework in 12 key areas. We look forward to its effective implementation through the full cooperation and participation of Member States. Properly implemented, those measures and the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident will serve to enhance global nuclear safety and promote the sustainable development of nuclear energy.

The work of the IAEA in the field of nuclear security, particularly the efforts to coordinate and enhance cooperation among various initiatives and activities, is also noteworthy. However, the threat of terrorism is real. Indeed, as evidenced by the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, 172 incidents were reported during the one-year period ending in June. Those include 14 cases of unauthorized possession

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and/or attempts to sell or smuggle nuclear material or radioactive sources. In that connection, the Republic of Korea remains committed to improving nuclear security through its contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and its support for the relevant legal instruments and international activities.

In March 2012, the Republic of Korea will host the second Nuclear Security Summit. The 2012 Seoul Summit will provide an excellent opportunity to review the commitments made at the Summit held in Washington, D.C., in 2010, assess existing nuclear security practices and challenges, and consider ways and means for realizing a stronger, more cohesive and responsive global nuclear security regime. While recognizing the central role of the IAEA in that field, the Seoul Summit will try to maximize the synergies among various initiatives and activities to keep nuclear materials and related facilities in safe hands. We look forward to a successful outcome and request the cooperation and support of the international community to that end.

We highly appreciate the comprehensive report released by the Director General early in September on the application of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24), the first of its kind in the history of the IAEA's dealings with the North Korean nuclear issue. The report is all the more meaningful as the Agency has provided an analysis of the uranium enrichment programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the first time since it was discovered in November 2010. The report states that that country's nuclear programme is a matter of serious concern and that information about the construction of a new uranium enrichment facility and a light-water reactor are deeply troubling.

Moreover, the report emphasizes that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not abandoned its existing nuclear programme, contrary to the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and underlines that the country's uranium enrichment programme therefore clearly violates those resolutions. In the current climate of dialogue, we look forward to the Agency resuming an active role in the process of the denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In addition, we welcome the unanimous adoption of the resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (GC(55)/RES/13) at the fifty-fifth IAEA General Conference, especially as it marks the first time that the international organization has condemned the country's uranium enrichment programme since it was discovered. The resolution expresses concern regarding the country's claimed uranium enrichment programme and light-water reactor construction and calls on the country to fully comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to promptly cooperate with the IAEA in the full and effective implementation of IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In that context, we strongly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea once again to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to immediately cease all related activities, including its uranium enrichment programme.

We take note of the entry into force of the comprehensive safeguards agreement in five States and of additional protocols in 10 States during 2010. It is encouraging to hear that 110 States have already ratified the additional protocol. We urge other Member States that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force the comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol.

In full support of the work of the IAEA, and with a view to achieving our common goal of harnessing nuclear energy in the service of peace and development for humanity, the Republic of Korea is pleased to sponsor the draft resolution (A/66/L.6) on the report of the IAEA.

Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would first like to extend my thanks to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Yukiya Amano, for his presentation. I would like to underline that Egypt has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/66/L.6.

International crises in the fields of energy and climate change pose constraints on the growing energy needs of the developing world in terms of quantity and quality. The IAEA report (see A/66/95) demonstrates the continued importance, amid those challenges, of nuclear technology for electricity generation and points out that 60 countries have so far expressed an interest in exploring the use of nuclear energy. Many of those States will begin operating their first reactors by 2030. That attests to the growing interest in the inalienable right to acquire and use nuclear technologies for

peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That right was further reiterated in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which emphasized the importance of respecting the decisions and policies of non-nuclear-weapon States regarding their plans to use nuclear energy for their development needs and for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the implementation of such plans, without any constraints and through international cooperation on the necessary nuclear technologies and materials.

The timetable of Egypt's nuclear energy programme has continued to evolve and to be assessed, as Egypt undergoes fundamental transformation, to allow the consideration of recent lessons learned from other countries' experiences as we continue to make progress in the implementation of this national project, working on achieving its legitimate goals and responding to our development needs. Egypt looks forward to further cooperation with the IAEA, given the Agency's growing role in supporting the sustainable development of its non-nuclear-weapon member States that are party to the NPT, and in light of its role in facilitating their access to nuclear energy and responding to their needs in that important area.

Egypt remains at the forefront of countries that have provided unlimited support to the IAEA since its establishment; it has continued that support to date, based on its belief in the value of the IAEA's role in nuclear non-proliferation and in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy to support the ambitions and global needs of developing countries in a wide range of areas.

States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty ensure compliance with the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA, which remains a major pillar of the non-proliferation system, through the Agency's verification and strengthening mechanisms. Nevertheless, that regime has yet to be fully effective as it lacks universality, especially in the Middle East region. Intensified international efforts are necessary to ensure implementation of the comprehensive safeguards system in all countries of the region without exception.

Significant progress is necessary to achieve a global comprehensive safeguards system, universality of the NPT and the accession to the NPT, as non-nuclear-weapon States, of three countries that remain outside the Treaty. That would encourage non-nuclear States to make further commitments and thus reinforce the NPT regime in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner both at regional and international levels.

At the regional level, all of the countries of the Middle East are in compliance with their obligations under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system, except Israel, whose opaque nuclear activities have remained outside any international control, while it has continued to ignore dozens of appeals and international resolutions demanding its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and the submission of all of its nuclear facilities to the full scope of the IAEA safeguards. There is no doubt that this continuing situation increases the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and hinders the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

In that regard, Egypt believes that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, to be convened in 2012, will offer promising prospects for concrete progress. In that context, Egypt looks forward to the background documents to be prepared by the IAEA in accordance with the fourth action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. My country welcomes the seminar convened by the European Union on 6 and 7 July on supporting the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The IAEA Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, to be held on 21 and 22 November, represents an additional opportunity to contribute to, rather than replace, the substantive preparations in support of the 2012 conference set to take place under the auspices of the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) of part I, section IV, of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)).

The year 2011 witnessed the earthquake and tsunami disasters that caused the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in March. Egypt reiterates its solidarity with the people of Japan in dealing with the effects of that disaster, and its willingness to provide assistance to any country facing a similar accident. Lessons must be drawn from the accident, which has shown the importance of the IAEA's central role in

matters relating to nuclear safety, including by assisting member States, at their request, in capacity-building and infrastructure, as well as in providing expertise and advice and in strengthening the nuclear safety culture in all parts of the world, while seeking to formulate comprehensive, progressive nuclear safety standards to be agreed by Member States in a gradual, comprehensive and transparent manner.

In that context, Egypt attaches great importance to the promotion of international cooperation aimed at strengthening national capacities in the field of nuclear safety and enabling them to respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies, in particular through the free flow of information and the transfer without prejudice of relevant technology. In accordance with its Statute, the IAEA should seek to assist member States with emergency preparedness and response to nuclear accidents, through capacity-building, including education and training in crisis management and technology transfer.

Those important issues were considered by the IAEA ministerial conference on nuclear safety held in Vienna in July 2011, which provided a forum for preliminary assessment of the Fukushima nuclear accident and for exchanging views on lessons learned aimed at further strengthening the framework on nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and response mechanisms. It also helped to launch a process — in which Egypt participated actively — that resulted in the adoption of the action plan of the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review. In the same vein, the high-level meeting convened by the Secretary-General on 22 September in New York was valuable in highlighting once again this important subject as well as the crucial role of the IAEA in this area.

Regarding nuclear security, the Seoul Summit to be held in March 2012 will serve as an opportunity to focus on the important issue of the security of nuclear materials and preventing them from falling into the hands of terrorists, complementing the other frameworks, including Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). On the other hand, the crucial role of the IAEA in the field of nuclear security must be anchored. Any guidelines or advice on nuclear security should be developed and negotiated in multilateral frameworks; and any initiatives and measures to enhance nuclear security and safety must not be used as a pretext for restricting the inalienable right of developing countries to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In that regard, Egypt reiterates its concern about the continued imposition of unwarranted restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology that will be used for peaceful purposes. Egypt emphasizes especially the responsibility of those countries that are advanced in the nuclear field to respond positively to the needs of developing countries with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear power, by allowing them to participate to the maximum extent possible in the transfer of equipment, materials, scientific information and nuclear technology and enabling them to derive the greatest benefits within their sustainable development strategies.

In the field of technical cooperation, Egypt will continue to exchange experiences with countries in the Arab region and the African continent, because it believes in the importance of international cooperation activities in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. In that regard, Egypt stresses that priority must be given to the Agency's activities in the field of technical cooperation, with the aim of enabling Egypt and other developing countries to benefit from the use of nuclear technologies in various sectors including health, agriculture, food and water resources and radioisotope technology. Thus, we reaffirm the importance of securing and increasing funding for international cooperation which is one of the main pillars of the work of the Agency, in accordance with its Statute.

Egypt also renews its determination to intensify and expand cooperation with the IAEA with the aim of strengthening our national capacities in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and to benefit from the full support of the Agency for our national efforts in efforts.

Mr. Onemola (Nigeria): I thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for his statement on the work of the Agency in the past year.

I would also like to convey my country's appreciation for the initiatives of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon with regard to the effort to prevent future tragedies at nuclear facilities by strengthening the capacity of the IAEA to promote nuclear safety and security and to enhance cooperation among international organizations, particularly in the areas of emergency response and information-sharing. We have no doubt that the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security held on the margins of the general debate

on 22 September will help build the political will needed to confront those challenges.

We commend Director General Amano and his team for delivering on the Agency's mandate in the areas of technical cooperation and nuclear safety, safeguards and security, despite numerous constraints, including in financial resources. Nigeria appreciates and commends their tireless efforts. We are delighted that the IAEA continues to contribute immensely to the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that humanity derives the maximum benefit from nuclear science and technology in a safe and secure environment.

The tragic Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in Japan has provoked global debate about the rationality of nuclear power. It has also led to a review of various measures that have been taken with regard to our common agenda of ensuring the safe and secure use of nuclear science and technology, as well as of ways of strengthening the Agency so as to deal with current and future challenges and enhance its capacity to further deliver the full benefits inherent in nuclear technology.

In that regard, I want to express my appreciation for the prompt and insightful initiatives of the Director General, including his decision to convene the June Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and put together the resulting Action Plan, which has already been endorsed at the Agency's fifty-fifth General Conference in September, as well as at the high-level meeting held here the same month. We expect that the implementation of the Action Plan and other measures at both the national and regional levels, informed by the lessons of the Fukushima accident, will go a long way towards addressing concerns about insecurity and restoring confidence in nuclear technology.

In spite of the apprehensions raised by the Fukushima accident, Nigeria remains convinced that nuclear technology, safely and responsibly applied, can facilitate the attainment of our energy development goals and those of other Millennium Development Goals, and therefore has a vital role to play in serving humankind's immediate needs. The introduction of nuclear-powered electricity into our national energy mix is high on the Nigerian Government's transformational agenda. We are working closely with the IAEA towards that goal, while honouring the attendant obligations to ensure safety and security. That is why for us in Nigeria, transparency in handling the information coming out of the Fukushima accident and the lessons learned from it are important, as they will help us to avoid dangerous pitfalls.

My delegation notes with satisfaction the Agency's phenomenal achievements in the application of nuclear technology in the area of food and agriculture, including its role in collaborating with the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, the African Union and other strategic partners in the total eradication of the deadly cattle disease known as rinderpest. We encourage the Agency to continue in its efforts to assist its member States in applying that technology to the diagnosis and control of other transboundary animal diseases, and ultimately to the promotion of food security. The focus at the fifty-fifth General Conference on the application of nuclear techniques to prospecting for and managing water was very timely, because it addressed one of humankind's current needs in both developed and developing countries.

We also appreciate the priority the Agency has given to cancer control in developing countries and its commitment to helping Member States to fight that scourge. We urge the Agency to increase its support to African countries in the areas of cancer therapy and manpower development, through its Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT). We welcome the assistance rendered to Member States through the Programme's imPACT reviews, which assess countries' readiness to develop long-term radiation medicine capacity-building plans as part of a national cancer control programme.

Nigeria's health sector has benefited from the Agency's cooperation in capacity and infrastructure development for cancer control and management, through advances in nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, radio-oncology and nuclear medicine technology. Through such cooperation, 10 nuclear medicine facilities are to be built, between 2010 and 2016, and equipped in tertiary hospitals across the country, through national funding. It is our expectation that our national programmes will continue to benefit from the Agency's Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy.

On technical cooperation, we would like to note that the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme has continued to make an invaluable contribution to the

efforts of Member States in addressing national development priorities and leveraging the comparative advantages of nuclear techniques. We welcome the increase in new resources reported by the Director General in his report, as well as the contributions of the United States and other donors under the Peaceful Uses Initiative, launched in 2010. I would like to encourage other Member States in a position to make extra budgetary contributions to join that United States initiative.

While the IAEA continues to coordinate multilateral efforts to ensure nuclear safety and security, we believe that the primary responsibility rests with Member States. In recognition of that principle, and in appreciation of the fact that with the benefits of nuclear technology come responsibilities, the Government of Nigeria has continued to build capacity, as well as to strengthen the requisite institutional framework.

In September, just two months ago, the Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission, the national focal agency for atomic energy development, was reconstituted as an independent and self-accounting agency. Furthermore, the Nigeria Nuclear Regulatory Authority is being strengthened to regulate our new nuclear power programme. In the area of nuclear waste management, which is key to the success of any national nuclear power programme, Nigeria, with a wide range of IAEA technical support in the areas of project design and implementation, has begun developing facilities for the comprehensive management of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes at the Nuclear Technology Centre at Sheda, in Abuja.

I would like to reaffirm Nigeria's commitment to the basic tenets of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to assure the Assembly that our national nuclear power programme will continue to be purely for peaceful purposes, geared to the enhancement of the living standards of the peoples of Nigeria, and will remain within the framework of verifiable safeguards.

The NPT remains a pillar for keeping our world safe from nuclear holocaust. The role of the IAEA in promoting a safer world remains pivotal. Nigeria therefore appreciates the initiative of the Director General in holding a forum this month to reinvigorate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We also look forward to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, as a forum vital to taking political decisions at the highest level on securing nuclear materials away from unauthorized end users.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate Nigeria's support for and abiding faith in the IAEA, and our confidence in its leadership in putting the benefits of the atom within the reach of all in a safer and secure world.

Mr. Al Habib (Islamic Republic of Iran): Today nuclear technology, as the common heritage of humankind, has yielded peaceful applications in numerous fields, ranging from medicine, food and agriculture to providing a cost-effective, environmentally friendly and climatically benign source of energy, and has thus played a significant role in the advancement of human society. Taking into account that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), according to its Statute, should accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity, we underline its prime responsibility to assist member States, including by facilitating technology transfer and increasing their scientific and technological capabilities.

The inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, without discrimination, constitutes the very foundation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This is set out in its article IV, in which States parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We emphasize that such an inalienable right shall not be restricted under any circumstances, including through ulterior outside political considerations. At the same time we are of the view that the implementation of related provisions of the NPT and the statute of the IAEA requires a realistic and balanced approach. Such an approach, by providing incentives for membership and compliance, can guarantee the longevity, integrity and credibility of the NPT.

Unfortunately, developed States parties to the NPT, the main suppliers of nuclear high technology, have given rise to two dangerous impressions by continuing to apply a discriminatory, selective, highly restrictive and politically motivated approach in their nuclear cooperation with developing States parties. First, being a party to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement does not facilitate nuclear

cooperation but rather impedes it, and therefore it is not a privilege. Secondly, States not parties to the Treaty are more richly and generously rewarded through nuclear cooperation.

It is a source of grave concern that those who have chosen not to accede to the NPT not only are not subject to any pressure to do so but are also encouraged and rewarded in different ways. A living example is the well-documented assistance and cooperation provided by certain Western countries — in particular the United States and the two nuclear-weapon States members of the European Union, the United Kingdom and France — to the Israeli regime, which, in addition to having an unsafeguarded nuclear programme, possesses one of the world's largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. That of course is a clear case of non-compliance by those NPT States parties with their legal obligations under the Treaty. Indeed, such double standards and discriminatory and paradoxical policies are contrary to the letter and spirit as well as the universality of the NPT and only undermine the integrity of the Treaty.

Recalling the importance of the IAEA's responsibilities in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and energy, as well as its role as the sole competent body for verification activities in accordance with its Statute and the NPT, we strongly emphasize the need to avoid the use of extralegal unilateral measures and attempts to use the Agency as an instrument in support of shortsighted political interests, as they only undermine the authority and credibility of the IAEA. Unfortunately, over the past decade a few Western countries have pursued a selective and politically motivated approach towards the verification activities of the IAEA. By calling it a watchdog organization, they attempt to imply that the IAEA is solely a verification tool and has no other mandate.

In this context, and recalling that the IAEA statute stipulates that the Agency should conduct its activities in a way that furthers the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament, I would like to reiterate that one of the neglected tasks of the IAEA is engagement in the nuclear disarmament process.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is extremely proud and highly honoured that, thanks to the activities of its courageous young nuclear scientists and despite all foreign-backed plots and plans, it has been able to exercise its inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran is fully committed to its legal obligations, and its nuclear activities are, and have always been, exclusively for peaceful purposes. Despite all external political pressure on the IAEA, it has repeatedly confirmed the non-diversion of nuclear materials and the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

Finally, I would like to underline that from a legal point of view, the IAEA should verify only declared nuclear material. The recent report by the IAEA Director General on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran states that the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and at locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement. It is regrettable that the IAEA Director General, in his statement yesterday (see A/66/PV.46), made reference to all nuclear materials — which is legally incorrect.

Mr. Osman (Sudan) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to extend our thanks to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for presenting the Agency's annual report to the General Assembly (see A/66/95). We commend the IAEA programmes and plans outlined in the report, which are designed to improve the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes, maintain an international system of nuclear security and bolster the safety of nuclear facilities. The report emphasizes the important role the Agency plays, particularly in the field of cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and development.

We would like to commend the work of the previous Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, and we wish his successor, Mr. Yukiya Amano, every success.

The Sudan attaches great importance to the contents of the report on the applications of nuclear technology in fostering food security, controlling insects and effectively managing water resources, as well as in modern irrigation systems and large-scale agricultural projects. From that perspective, improving the cooperation between the Agency and UNICEF on agricultural and educational enterprises, and with the World Health Organization, becomes increasingly important.

Assisting developing countries to improve their respective national technical systems complements the efforts of the Agency to implement its plans and technical cooperation programmes. We hope that cooperation will improve within the framework of the Agency's health programmes in order to revive and support continental and regional projects aimed at fighting insect carriers of malaria and other lethal diseases affecting Africans, and thus to enable the continent to successfully achieve its socio-economic development programmes, in particular the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the internationally agreed economic agenda.

The Sudanese delegation emphasizes the right of all States, including my country, to improve research and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in accordance with international terms of reference and commitments.

My delegation would like also to stress the need for States to refrain from putting pressure on the Agency or interfering with its activities, in order to preserve the Agency's credibility and its vital role. In that context, we call for justice and equity in tackling some of the outstanding issues involving some States, through dialogue and negotiations, with a view to reaching appropriate solutions.

Moreover, the delegation of the Sudan reiterates its firm position in supporting the aspirations of all geographical regions to declare themselves free from nuclear weapons, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which constitutes one of the main pillars in the international peace and security system. On that basis, we feel concerned by the fact that the Middle East region has for many decades, remained far from achieving that goal, due to opposition by Israel — the only country in the region than possesses nuclear weapons — and its refusal to place its nuclear programmes under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards regime, in addition to its continuous disregard for the appeals and repeated initiations made by the international community in that matter. Israel's adherence to the Treaty and its Additional Protocol are vital factors for eliminating the tension experienced in the region and could lead to strengthened regional security and the maintenance of international peace and security.

My country is equally enthusiastic in its hope that the Agency will continue to support the right of developing countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, along with the Agency's monitoring of such activities. It is our conviction that the production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would lead to a considerable surge in efforts towards development, given the low cost of electricity produced through nuclear energy as compared to other energy sources. The rising cost of alternative energy sources will force developing countries to look for faster and more practicable means to solve their problems of energy shortage.

The Sudan is persuaded that greater cooperation and support by developed countries for developing countries in the field of alternative energy sources would lessen the risk of resort to nuclear energy. We think that it is logical for the IAEA to encourage developed countries to work side by side with developing countries on that matter.

In that connection, my delegation welcomes the efforts of the Agency and of many developed countries to foster cooperation with the African States in the use of nuclear energy in the medical and health sectors, as well as on alternative energy projects in an effective manner conducive to achieving the MDGs.

Mr. Cassidy (Indonesia): Allow me first to warmly welcome our fellow country member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Lao People's Democratic Republic, as a new member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This now increases the IAEA members from ASEAN countries to nine. Indonesia stands ready to cooperate closely and to share its experience with the Lao People's Democratic Republic in many areas of nuclear cooperation.

On this occasion, we would like to express our support to the Director General for the way in which he has been carrying out his responsibilities at the IAEA, which has led to more weight being given to the Agency's technical role. We were delighted by his visit to Jakarta from 6 to 9 October. Apart from holding important meetings with major national stakeholders and visiting our nuclear facilities, in our capacity as the Chair of ASEAN, we also facilitated his visit to the ASEAN secretariat, where he met with its representatives and those of the Council of Permanent Representatives. It is our profound hope that such visits will strengthen IAEA cooperation, not only with Indonesia but also with ASEAN.

We express our sympathy to the people and Government of Japan over the unfortunate events that took place in March involving the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. We also express our admiration and respect for the tremendous courage and resilience shown by the Japanese emergency team in getting the facility back under control. As an expression of Indonesian solidarity with the people and Government of Japan, the Indonesian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, apart from sending rescue workers, medical assistance and supplies in the early days of the accident, offered to dispatch its nuclear emergency response team to Fukushima.

As the Chair of ASEAN, Indonesia also initiated a special meeting of the foreign ministers of Japan and ASEAN in April to promote further cooperation in disaster management. In May, one of our experts on nuclear radiological protection and emergency response was honoured by the opportunity to join an IAEA-led international fact-finding mission to Fukushima.

In order to restore public confidence in the safety and sustainability of nuclear power, including in Indonesia, it is of critical importance to address nuclear safety and place it high on the global agenda.

Globally, public expectations for bold action are high after the last nuclear accident. We should seize the present momentum to help in shaping a global rethinking on nuclear safety. In that regard, my country was pleased to see that, on 22 September, the IAEA General Conference unanimously endorsed the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which Ministers had requested in their declaration at the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in June. Indonesia looks forward to finding ways and means to contribute actively to the implementation of the Action Plan.

We remain of the view that IAEA technical cooperation plays an indispensable role as the Agency's main vehicle for delivering on its mandate to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, especially in the developing regions of the world. Since joining the IAEA, in 1957, Indonesia has enjoyed a great deal of cooperation with the IAEA in many areas of nuclear applications not involving power generation, such as in nuclear techniques for water resources, research reactor construction and operation, uranium extraction, food irradiation, radioisotope production and mutation-assisted plant breeding. The extensive use of nuclear techniques for socio-economic development led to growing recognition of the importance of nuclear technology for development in Indonesia.

Therefore, we strongly feel that now is the time for Indonesia to share its long-developed knowledge and experience with other developing countries. In this regard, we are ready to serve as a technical cooperation destination country to further support the IAEA in promoting its technical cooperation programmes.

As a country that has benefited from a wide application of nuclear techniques for water, we support the decision of the Director General of the IAEA to prioritize nuclear techniques for water this year. Isotope tracer technology has been widely used by Indonesian universities, the national geology agency and the drinking water industry, as well as in geothermal exploration. For geothermal exploitation, isotope tracers have been utilized to determine recharge areas and the origin of geothermal fluids. Regarding water management, isotope technology has also been widely applied to resolve recharge area and groundwater dating. In Indonesia, isotope hydrology has contributed to the mitigation of water shortages in areas that have a problem with water sanitation.

The role of the Regional Cooperative Agreement (RCA) in the promotion of the use of nuclear technology for socio-economic development in the Asia-Pacific cannot be overlooked. In the almost 40 years of the RCA's existence, the participating countries and the Agency have accumulated valuable experience in cooperation and coordination of nuclear-related development activities in the region. Therefore, we are determined to continue our active participation in this regional process. As the current Chairman of the RCA, in April 2011 Indonesia hosted the 33rd Meeting of National RCA Representatives in Bali, with around 60 representatives from participating countries attending.

Indonesia has made progress this year in managing radioactive waste and spent fuel. We submitted our instrument of ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management on 1 April.

Indonesia continues to support international cooperation in nuclear security and the centrality of the IAEA's role in this area. Therefore, Indonesia supports

the Agency's continued fostering of coordination and exchange of information with other relevant organizations and nuclear security-related initiatives in order to prevent duplication between Agency programmes and those under consideration by other entities, thus ensuring the continued effectiveness of the Agency's nuclear security programme. Indonesia also supports those who suggest that the Agency should establish a mechanism that would allow all member States to be involved in an inclusive manner in the development of Nuclear Security Series documents.

Together with representatives of the IAEA, Indonesia co-hosted the High-level Regional Workshop on the International Legal Framework for Nuclear Security, from 20 to 22 July. The Workshop, which was attended by representatives of ASEAN member countries, has raised awareness of the importance of strong and effective measures to enhance nuclear security.

From the discussion, Indonesia notes the value of model legislation and implementation kits for nuclear security that could be used to transpose certain provisions into national legislation. Indonesia emphasizes the importance of updating the IAEA's 2010 *Handbook on Nuclear Law: Implementing Legislation*, so that in the future it could serve as model legislation to speed up national implementation.

Our commitment to safeguards implementation remains strong. In collaboration with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia is part of efforts to enhance safeguards collaboration in the region by launching the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network. The Network serves as a vehicle to define how we implement the safeguards, assuring the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful uses in the economically vibrant Asia-Pacific region.

On the issue of safeguards in the Middle East, we continue to support the IAEA taking a comprehensive and balanced approach in addressing non-proliferation issues in the region. Likewise, Indonesia has supported the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including with regard to the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States.

In pursuit of paving a way for the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Indonesia fully supports the Director General's initiative to convene a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone forum in Vienna later this month, and stands ready to participate constructively in the process, both in its national capacity and its capacity as Chairman of the Commission for the South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

Mr. Aquino (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): My country has joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/66/L.6 on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an expression of our firm support of the Agency's work.

Peru, a founding member of the IAEA, has just concluded its term on the Board of Governors for the period 2009 to 2011, where it actively participated in addressing the main issues of the Agency. In recognition of its committed participation, the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States has endorsed Peru's candidature to return to the Board of Governors for the 2013 to 2015 term.

The nuclear accident in the Fukushima Daiichi plant has marked an important point in the Agency's work. While Peru recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear security falls on States, we are convinced that the IAEA plays a very important role in promoting international cooperation and in the coordination of global efforts to strengthen the global nuclear security regime. In that regard, we believe, with an eye to the Agency's mandate, technical specialization and broad membership, that it is the appropriate forum in which to address all issues related to nuclear security.

Although we would have preferred a more ambitious document, my delegation commends the approval of the post-Fukushima action plan, which contains a series of specific measures to strengthen nuclear security. It is a realistic document and has the merit of including the concerns of all Agency member States.

The progress made in the sphere of nuclear security should be seen in the overall framework of the initiative undertaken by the Director General of the IAEA in convening a ministerial-level conference in

June 2011 and in the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security convened by the Secretary-General here at United Nations Headquarters in September, as well as other significant initiatives undertaken by the international community. In applauding and encouraging such initiatives, my delegation wishes to emphasize that it is necessary that throughout this process of strengthening the nuclear security regime, the central function of the Agency in coordinating such efforts must be preserved.

At the national level, my delegation wishes to highlight the important work undertaken jointly with the Agency. If I may, I would like to highlight some of the technical cooperation activities that are geared to supporting the National Institute for Neoplastic Diseases in fighting cancer, the National Agrarian University La Molina in its projects to improve grains and native grain varieties, and the Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute in its research activities, as well as the country's other significant research institutes, such as the Peruvian University Cayetano in its projects to improve South American cameloids.

By reiterating Peru's support for the management of the IAEA Director General, Ambassador Yukiya Amano — specifically the work related to nuclear applications in health, agriculture and water treatment — we wish to highlight the fact that the Director General visited Peru at the end of June 2011. He was able to observe directly the progress in various projects that the Agency has undertaken in Peru, all of which play an important role in developing the fight against poverty, and in agriculture, ground water and areas such as human health, industry, nuclear security and other areas.

Peru believes that in order to give adequate attention to the needs of developing countries, the Agency should focus its priorities on the following four areas. First is the fight against cancer. Taking into account that two thirds of diagnosed cases of cancer occur in developing countries, Peru believes that it is urgent to create national capacities, both in training professionals and in acquiring equipment for diagnosis and treatment. Second is improvement of food availability through nuclear applications in agriculture. Third is support for member States that decide to implement nuclear power plans by supplying them with the necessary technical, economic and legislative assistance. Fourth is improving the study of water through isotopic techniques for water purification and using those techniques in agriculture and the management of groundwater resources.

In the regional arena, since 1984 Peru has been an active participant in the Regional Agreement of Technical Cooperation for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean, with special emphasis on projects linked to training human resources and developing infrastructure in areas related to health, agriculture, energy and hydrology. I should also emphasize that in 2010 Peru joined the Ibero American Forum of Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Security Regulatory Agencies, which works actively to standardize national regulatory legislation.

In this Hall, we would like to reiterate our support for and recognition of the Agency and its more than 50 years as the principal international governmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and as the guarantor of compliance with international commitments to use nuclear installations and materials for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Mr. Langeland (Norway): Norway is pleased to sponsor of the draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (A/66/L.6). My Government attaches great importance to the IAEA. Besides being a key guardian of our collective non-proliferation regime, it is an important partner in promoting social and economic development while ensuring the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes. Through its extensive Technical Cooperation Programme, the Agency plays an important role in contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are closely linked. We cannot achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), unless there is confidence in the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. Thus it is vital that we provide the Agency with the necessary legal tools to implement its non-proliferation mandate.

Norway therefore reiterates that the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols constitute the verification standard. Norway also remains convinced that the IAEA has an important role to play in verifying nuclear disarmament. Norway

continues to urge countries with outstanding proliferation issues to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving these matters and in demonstrating the exclusively peaceful nature of their nuclear programmes.

Achieving a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is an important goal both from a regional point of view and to reinforce the global non-proliferation regime. Norway will chair the IAEA forum on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East to be held this month in Vienna and believes that it will represent a significant contribution on the part of the IAEA towards that goal.

The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also underlined the importance of international cooperation with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The tragic event in Fukushima earlier this year, as well as other safety incidents, has demonstrated the critical importance of safety to nuclear energy. The role of the IAEA will thus be even more crucial in the years to come.

We look forward to working closely with the Agency in promoting nuclear security. Norway has provided substantial voluntary contributions to support the IAEA's work to strengthen nuclear safety and security in developing countries and to the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank. It is imperative that we, the member States, provide adequate and predictable funding so that the Agency can carry out its important mandate. It is equally important that the international community demonstrate full political support for the IAEA. My delegation expects that today's draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

Mrs. `izare (Ethiopia): I would first like to take note with satisfaction of the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see A/66/95), which describes the Agency's significant achievements during 2010. My appreciation also goes to Ambassador Yukiya Amano, Director General of the IAEA, for his comprehensive and informative statement on the main developments in the Agency's activities during that period. My delegation is a sponsor of draft resolution A/66/L.6, on the report.

We are pleased to recognize the progress made by the IAEA over the past year in further enhancing its contribution to global efforts to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes. We remain convinced that within the framework of its three pillars, the Agency will continue to strengthen its technical support role to expand international cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. We believe that the Agency's sustained technical assistance to developing nations — particularly in the areas of agriculture, human health, water resource management, energy planning, non-destructive testing and radiation protection — should be highlighted and its technical assistance programmes strengthened. In this regard we welcome the budgetary increase for the Technical Cooperation Fund.

Ethiopia attaches great importance to the work of the IAEA and appreciates the useful technical cooperation that the Agency is providing to member States, particularly developing nations. The Agency's growing role in helping developing countries achieve their socio-economic development goals is indeed encouraging, especially in its efforts to combat and eradicate diseases in cattle, which have resulted in tangible progress in the agriculture and livestock sectors. Moreover, many of the Agency's projects have helped to ensure access to clean water and promote environmental sustainability. In this context, and in order to reach the goals set by the Millennium Declaration (resolution 55/2) by 2015, the Agency's technical assistance programme should be strengthened with a view to expanding the scope of its activities aimed at supporting developing countries, and particularly least developed ones.

Ethiopia is a beneficiary of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme. Among the various areas where we have technical cooperation with the Agency is an ongoing project to eradicate the tsetse fly from the Southern Rift Valley region of Ethiopia through an integrated pest management approach. I am very pleased to report that the project has started to benefit several communities by helping them to regain their farmland and resume their normal livestock activities. Strengthening such concrete gains requires enhanced technical support from the Agency and an integrated development approach that takes into account proper land-use planning and management.

It is also worth mentioning that the technical cooperation between Ethiopia and the Agency in the area of human health has resulted in establishing a modest national infrastructure for the application of nuclear medicine and radiotherapy. A project is being designed for 2012-2017 to consolidate the existing

radiotherapy and nuclear medicine facilities in five regional state university hospitals for efficient diagnosis and curative and palliative treatment for cancer patients. I would therefore like to request that the Agency further strengthen its cooperation in this area, in order to combat cancer through sustainable therapy programmes. We are also encouraged by our technical cooperation with the IAEA in applying isotope techniques in the management of our water resources and by our progress to date in implementing that cooperation programme.

I wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude for the technical support that we receive through the Agency and its member States and from the African Development Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other international organizations in these areas, in particular for the eradication of the tsetse fly and trypanosomiasis from Ethiopia. We welcome the steps the Agency has taken to formalize the cooperation framework in support of the Pan-African Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Eradication Campaign, as that framework is critical to eradicating poverty and to increasing agricultural productivity. We call on the Agency to continue to accord high priority to the implementation of the cooperation framework.

We consider peaceful nuclear applications a critical input to our continued efforts to carry out national development strategies, policies and programmes. Indeed, we very much appreciate the Agency's technical support in the development and completion of our Country Programme Framework for the period 2012-2017. Obviously, the Framework is a significant step in efforts to develop our national nuclear science and technology infrastructure, and we request the Agency to extend its cooperation for the full implementation of the Framework.

Ethiopia supports the Agency's efforts to promote and ensure global nuclear safety. Ethiopia is committed to further strengthening the national radiation and nuclear safety and security infrastructure and to ensuring the safe operation of equipment that uses radiation sources. The Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority will continue to work towards full implementation of regulatory control systems in all thematic safety areas. In that regard, my delegation would like to commend the activities of the IAEA in assisting member States, including my own country, in the peaceful use of nuclear energy through the development of effective and efficient programmes to improve scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities.

We firmly believe it is necessary to ensure, on a systematic basis, the provision of sufficient and predictable resources to the Agency's technical programmes and, more importantly, a balanced distribution of resources to its safeguards and technical cooperation activities in the area of nuclear safety. That is important, especially in view of the fact that the Agency's role in transferring peaceful technology is so necessary to developing countries for the achievement of their socio-economic goals.

In conclusion, allow me to extend once again our support to the IAEA for its efforts in the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. We hope the IAEA will continue to promote its noble objectives into the next year.

Mr. El-Mesallati (Libya) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to express our appreciation and gratitude to Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for presenting the Agency's report to the General Assembly (see A/66/95).

Having examined the report of the Agency submitted to this session of the Assembly, our country's delegation would like to express its heartfelt appreciation to the secretariat of the IAEA, in particular the Department of Technical Cooperation, for its rapid response, support and efforts to strengthen cooperation in the fields of health, water resources management and education, which are our national priorities.

Our country's delegation would like to emphasize the rights of developing countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to have access to nuclear material and equipment and to exchange and transfer scientific and technical information in that regard.

Our country clearly declares its position on the need to take practical steps to support the Agency, with a view to preserving its credibility and to implementing, in a balanced manner, its three pillars — non-proliferation, technical cooperation and verification — and the comprehensive safeguards regime and additional protocols.

We call on the entire international community to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to the comprehensive safeguards regime so as to demonstrate its commitment to the international treaties, agreements and conventions that it has signed.

Libya expresses its support for the Director General of the Agency, in particular his statement before the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. We believe that nuclear disarmament should be of the utmost importance to the Agency and that it plays a significant role in verification activities. Nuclear disarmament has a positive impact and will help strengthen all efforts towards non-proliferation.

In that connection, our country commends the activities of the Agency to foster international cooperation in the fields of nuclear and radiological safety. We place great emphasis on that issue, and thus Libya has acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. We have participated in all activities in that regard.

We have set up an office to oversee nuclear and radiological safety and security. It is an independent monitoring agency that, under enforced national legislation, will execute its mandate in full independence, in compliance with the Agency's standards. We also commend the Agency's role in combating any threat by terrorist groups to use nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the National Transitional Council expresses our interest in fostering cooperation with all friendly States and with the Agency in order to secure all radioactive material in Libya, which is now in safe areas and can be accessed only by permission from the authorities. A delegation from the Agency will visit Libya shortly to verify that such material is protected.

Our country places the highest emphasis on international peace and security, in particular in the Middle East region. The Middle East has become a hotbed of tension because Israel possesses nuclear arms, which has led other countries to seek to obtain such weapons.

It has been more than 15 years since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted a resolution to establish in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. Such a zone was also underscored in the outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. That Conference highlighted that the resolution would continue to be in effect until all its purposes and objectives, including the achievement of the universality of the Treaty, had been achieved.

The conference to be held in 2012 will be attended by all countries of the Middle East with a view to underscoring the importance of implementing the above-mentioned resolution, namely, the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. The conference will be held in Finland. Our country expresses its full support for that conference and for its goals of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and peace and security in the region.

My country's delegation calls on all nuclear-weapon countries to adopt programmes to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and to put an end to all programmes for the development of such weapons, pursuant to the legal commitments undertaken in article VI of the NPT and highlighted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which stated that the NPT should represent a firm commitment to destroy all nuclear arsenals and that otherwise the Treaty would be meaningless.

As long as one nuclear weapon exists, the world faces an enormous danger and a commensurate responsibility on the part of nuclear-weapon States. Otherwise, nuclear-weapon-free zones will be meaningless.

Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): Despite the unanimous view that the only actual nuclear danger in the Middle East lies in Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to distant regions, some of those who turn a blind eye to this clear-cut situation are pleased to open illusory fronts with suspect motives. Needless to say, such dishonest and non-objective actions evidently expose the falsity of their assertions that they care about the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East.

For decades, they themselves were responsible for supplying Israel with the nuclear technology and materials that enabled it to acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, including sophisticated submarines. They tried their best to divert attention

from Israel's nuclear weapons during the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York last year.

The prevailing hypocrisy on nuclear issues that marks the statements and attitudes of some representatives of Western States hinders progress in nuclear non-proliferation efforts. It irresponsibly encourages nuclear proliferation by a party that is still outside the NPT and that refuses to subject its nuclear installations to the international monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In that connection, I would recall that the conduct of those Western States violates articles I and II of the NPT. The Agency must therefore hold those Western States accountable and responsible for those violations.

We regret that we are hearing words that only heighten our concerns, such as the crass insinuation made against my country by the observer of the European Union (EU) in his statement yesterday (see A/66/PV.46). We would like to remind him that many EU member States do not at all comply with their commitments under the NPT. I refer to that state of non-compliance for two main reasons. The first is the presence of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear European States. The second is the fact that those Western States continue to supply Israel with nuclear technology and materials and their means of delivery.

In his statement yesterday, the Director General of the IAEA said that the Agency had finally come to the conclusion that it was very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in 2007 housed a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency. He went on to say that in June the IAEA Board of Governors found Syria to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and reported that non-compliance to the Security Council and the General Assembly. In that connection, allow me to make the following observations.

First, the IAEA Director General knows full well that Syria made the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) one of its main national priorities. Syria therefore hastened to accede very early to the NPT, doing so in 1968. By the same token, it signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency in 1992.

Moreover, in 2003, when Syria was a member of the Security Council, it presented a draft resolution on behalf of the Arab Group that is still in blue ink in the Security Council. That draft resolution was designed to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

These examples show that our national commitment is credible and should not be questioned. When it was presented in 2003, the draft resolution, which is in accordance with the provisions and objectives of the IAEA, clashed with the opposition of an influential permanent, nuclear-weapon State in the Security Council that threatened to use its veto if Syria insisted on putting the draft resolution to a vote.

Second, the Security Council and the IAEA did not condemn Israel's flagrant aggression against my country's sovereignty in 2007, probably because they are inured to Israel's violations of resolutions of international legitimacy and do not hold it accountable. As the Assembly well knows, Israel refused to cooperate with the Agency or to allow its inspectors to verify potential sources of pollution emanating from the Israeli rockets that were used to bomb the Dair Alzour site, as well as the materials it used in contaminating and destroying the bombed site.

In that respect, Israel's continued refusal to cooperate with the Agency's requirements, its continued improvement of its military nuclear capability outside of any international control or supervision and its disregard for all appeals to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, diminish the credibility of the NPT system and threaten the security and stability of the peoples and States of the Middle East.

These are extremely grave matters. We had hoped that the IAEA Director General would have referred to those issues in his statement, instead of resorting to such expressions as "highly probable".

Third, as a very useful exercise, I will now read out to colleagues a paragraph from the memoir of the former Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, *The Age of Deception — Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times*. The paragraph is found on pages 228 and 229 of the memoir.

(*spoke in English*)

> "One of the strangest and most striking examples of nuclear hypocrisy, multilateral and multifaceted, must surely be Israel's bombing of the Dair Alzour installation in Syria in September 2007, and the aftermath of that attack. Speculation began almost immediately that the site had housed a nuclear facility. Syria denied the accusations. Israel and the United States remained officially silent, although American officials talked anonymously on the subject to the media. I spoke out strongly, noting that any country with information indicating that the bombed facility was nuclear was under a legal obligation to report it to the IAEA. But no one came forward with such a report. For the six weeks following the bombing — the most crucial period in terms of our seeing inside the facility — we were unable to obtain any high resolution imagery from commercial satellites."

(*spoke in Arabic*)

He states that the United States of America refused to supply the IAEA with the high-resolution imagery that the United States claimed indicated the presence of a building containing a nuclear reactor in Dair Alzour. If the accusations by the United States had been correct, why would they have refused to submit those high-resolution satellite images, as they were the ones who possessed them. That was the question asked by Mr. ElBaradei.

I will continue reading from the same paragraph.

(*spoke in English*)

> "On October 28, in New York, I gave an interview on CNN's *Late Edition* with Wolf Blitzer. In response to Blitzer's question as to whether the Syrian facility was a nuclear reactor, I said we had not seen any evidence to conclude one way or the other. But I was clear on one point: that 'to bomb first and then ask questions later,' as Israel had done, was deliberately undermining the system. Only the IAEA, I pointed out, had the means to verify allegations of clandestine nuclear activity. In another interview, with Charlie Rose two days later, I pointed out that Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor had only served as motivation to accelerate Saddam Hussein's clandestine nuclear program."

(*spoke in Arabic*)

Mr. ElBaradei continues on page 230 of his memoir,

(*spoke in English*)

> "but it was clear that my condemnation of the bombing at Dair Alzour had touched a nerve. John Bolton was openly supportive of Israel's action."

(*spoke in Arabic*)

John Bolton was the American Permanent Representative to the United Nations three years ago.

(*spoke in English*)

> "In an interview on CNN's *Late Edition*, Wolf Blitzer asked Bolton what he thought of my public assertion that Israel should have brought its 'evidence' to the IAEA. 'If you believe that,' Bolton retorted, 'I have a bridge to sell you. The notion that Israel or the United States would put their national security in the IAEA's hands is just delusional.'"

(*spoke in Arabic*)

That is what Bolton said when he was asked to respond to ElBaradei. The memoir continues:

(*spoke in English*)

> "To hear these sentiments coming from the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations was dreadful."

(*spoke in Arabic*)

Fourth, compliance by the States parties to the Agency Statute makes it necessary for the United States of America to inform the Agency of the information it had before destroying the building, and not eight months later. The same thing applies to Israel, which supplied the Agency with information, if such information were accurate. Rather, it launched a military attack on the territory of the State of Syria, penetrating the air space of a neighbouring State.

The Agency did not deal with this in an integrated manner, nor did it take necessary measures in accordance with its responsibilities and mandate with regard to the encroachments and violations of the

international nuclear commitments by Israel and by the United States of America, in accordance with the NPT.

Fifth, most of the contents and the findings of the Agency in the course of the mandate of the current Director General regarding the Dair Alzour site have relied on the imagery and analyses presented by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America. My country would therefore question the credibility of such information received by the Agency, as well as the nature of corroborating documents, taking into consideration that such information was presented by a State in pursuit of a political agenda that is hostile to the interests of my country, Syria.

Sixth, the current report of the Director General contains incomplete findings based on information that lacks credibility and inclusiveness. The Agency's assessments clearly run counter to its previous assessments, as we have mentioned previously.

Seventh, the continued confusion between the legal commitment of a member State by virtue of its safeguards agreement, and its voluntary accession to the additional protocol, has no legal basis and constitutes another means of bringing political pressure to bear on Syria.

Eighth, with respect to States that attempt to cover up for Israel's nuclear weapons, we pose a question to them, to the Director General of the IAEA, and to the IAEA. We would like to ask all of them what action they have taken to implement Security Council resolution 487 (1981), which was adopted on 19 June 1981 — meaning that more than 30 years have passed since then. What have they done to carry out that resolution? At this point, allow me to quote the Security Council's call on Israel in paragraph 5 of the resolution:

(*spoke in English*)

> "to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards".

(*spoke in Arabic*)

That resolution was adopted three decades ago.

Next, in its important *Yearbook on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) devoted a complete section to what it termed Israeli nuclear forces. From this rostrum, I call on the IAEA and the nuclear-weapons depositary States of the NPT, as well as the nuclear-weapons States members of the Security Council, to read that chapter and learn the necessary lessons. I am talking about the book I have in my hand. In particular, those specialists here who work on the First Committee and on disarmament matters know what I am talking about. This book was not published in Damascus; it was published in Stockholm.

Mr. Haniff (Malaysia): On behalf of the delegation of Malaysia, I join others in thanking the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for his presentation to the General Assembly of the annual report of the Agency for 2010 (see A/66/95). Malaysia is also pleased to sponsor draft resolution A/66/L.6. My delegation also wishes to welcome the Dominican Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Tonga as new member States of the Agency.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entitles States parties to have access to nuclear technology. The Treaty also provides for the exchange of nuclear knowledge and scientific information and fosters cooperation among States for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection, Malaysia greatly appreciates the IAEA's role in assisting States in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. The promotion of peaceful applications of nuclear energy constitutes a fundamental activity of the IAEA, as highlighted in IAEA documents. In that regard, my delegation is of the view that the IAEA must be equipped with sufficient, assured and predictable resources to enable it to implement its mandated activities so that States pursuing peaceful uses of nuclear energy can benefit from the transfer of nuclear technology.

As outlined in the Agency's report, more than 60 countries have expressed an interest in exploring the use of nuclear power. Those countries include my own, Malaysia. As part of Malaysia's economic transformation programme, nuclear power development has been identified as one of the main projects for future power generation. It is aimed purely at ensuring an adequate electricity supply for the people of Malaysia beyond the year 2020. The Government of Malaysia is currently conducting an in-depth study of the project before making a final decision on the matter. Our focus is on developing a comprehensive nuclear programme, including legal and

regulatory frameworks, involving the assessment of public opinion and creation of a public relations plan. The studies will be conducted by independent consultants, taking into consideration lessons learned from major nuclear incidents in the past, as well as the results of stress tests on nuclear power plants by member States. The overarching objective is to ensure that the highest standards of nuclear safety are observed at all times, thus contributing to strengthening global nuclear safety.

With regard to the development of a more comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework, my delegation appreciates the IAEA's input into our draft comprehensive nuclear law, which seeks to strengthen existing legislation. In addition, Malaysia has also passed a strategic trade act, covering export control measures for all single- and dual-use strategic goods, including nuclear, chemical, biological and missile-related items, as well as conventional arms.

At the regional level, Malaysia has always recognized the importance of regional cooperation and has participated actively in many regional projects under the aegis of the Agency. Malaysia welcomes the Agency's efforts to create a common framework for nuclear waste and spent fuel management for the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the consultancy meeting on recommendations in spent fuel and radioactive waste management for ASEAN held in March, and through other efforts in the field of nuclear security and safety.

Notwithstanding the growing renewed interest in nuclear power generation, Malaysia still accords high priority to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology for enhanced food and water security, human health, natural resources and environmental management, industrial development and medical applications. These sectors are being supported by further developments in national capabilities in peaceful nuclear technology research and development, commercialization, the development of a more comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework, technological infrastructure, human capital development, competency verification, public information, compliance with the international system of nuclear governance, and engagement in international cooperation.

In that regard, my delegation wishes to thank the IAEA, particularly its Technical Cooperation Department, for its continuing support for the implementation of IAEA technical cooperation projects and various other activities in Malaysia, including the trust shown to Malaysia in continuing to have it host the IAEA postgraduate educational course in radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources. My delegation also wishes to express its gratitude to other member States that have shown interest in the course, which has attracted candidates from beyond our region as well as within it.

In addition, Malaysia is also pleased and appreciative of the fact that the Malaysian Nuclear Agency has been redesignated, for the period 2010-2014, as the IAEA Collaborating Centre for Radiation Processing of Natural Polymer and Nanomaterials. Among other things, the Centre has demonstrated the radiation-aided production of non-toxic, environmentally friendly palm oil acrylates for printing applications.

With regard to the assurance of supplies of nuclear fuel, my delegation welcomes the continued discussions on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle under the auspices of the IAEA. Malaysia reiterates that any further consideration of the issue of assurance of supply must be based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addresses the views and concerns of all Member States. Malaysia remains convinced that further consideration of individual proposals on this matter must be preceded by a consensus agreement adopted by the General Conference on the conceptual framework that outlines the specific political, technical, economic and legal parameters. My delegation notes the Agency's continuing efforts to establish and improve the concept of a low-enriched-uranium bank facility. Nonetheless, we wish to underline that such an arrangement must accommodate the inalienable rights of NPT States parties to nuclear technology.

With regard to international effort to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which was agreed to by States party to the NPT during the NPT Review Conference in 2010, my delegation welcomes the appointment of Mr. Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Security Policy of Finland, as facilitator. We also welcome the designation of Finland as the host Government for the 2012 Conference, which could provide the impetus for the creation of

such zone in the Middle East. We also support the efforts of the Director General to convene an IAEA forum in Vienna later this month to further support this process.

Finally, Malaysia would like to express once again its appreciation to the Director General of IAEA, as well as to the IAEA secretariat for their significant and valuable work in fulfilling the Agency's mandate.

The Acting President: We have heard the last speaker in the debate on agenda item 86.

We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/66/L.6. Before giving the floor to the speakers in explanation of vote before the voting, may I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Ri Tong Il (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Concerning the general statements made earlier, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to express its heartfelt thanks to the representatives who showed attention and support for the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Concerning draft resolution A/66/L.6 and the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/66/95), the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea totally and categorically rejects that report. The report again refers to the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as to the Agency's previous history of behaving impartially. In particular, the report refers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with no basis in fundamental reality, and is therefore misleading with regard to that reality.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to make a few comments concerning the factors that violate and distort the fundamental reality.

First of all, the report refers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as if it were a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That is not the case in reality. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea withdrew from IAEA in 1994 and from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003. Those withdrawals are in line with international law. In particular, article X of the Treaty stipulates that States parties can withdraw from the NPT if the supreme interest of that State is in jeopardy, and that was in fact the case for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In 2002, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was included on the Bush Administration's list of the axis of evil; everybody knows that. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was included on the Bush Administration's list of seven countries in line for nuclear pre-emptive strikes, and those policies, which were part of the Bush Administration's nuclear doctrine, compelled the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea made a firm decision to exit the Treaty in order to defend our supreme interest, namely, the security, dignity and sovereignty of the country.

When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea joined the NPT, it was in the expectation that the nuclear danger would be removed from the peninsula. As everybody knows, the United States introduced nuclear weapons into South Korea in 1957. The first nuclear weapons arrived in South Korea in 1957. The total had reached 1,000 by 1970. Everybody can imagine the threat of nuclear disaster with which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been living for over six decades. Given that situation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had no choice but to withdraw from the NPT.

Secondly, with respect to the fundamental reality, the report makes reference to uranium enrichment. Everybody has an equal right to enrich uranium under international law. That is in line with international trends and is reflected in the report, which states that over 90 countries are now moving towards peaceful nuclear energy. Those countries opted for nuclear power to meet their energy needs, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has made the same choice. In particular, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a party to the Six-Party Talks, under which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has that right, which is stipulated as a component of the Six-Party Talks.

If one considers the historical background, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been damaged in its construction of independent nuclear power. In 1994, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States agreed on a framework, the first ever historical document between the two sides, which have had hostile relations. By 2003, the

United States was obliged to provide light-water reactors in compensation for freezing the verified moderate reactor that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been conducting with a capacity of 2 million kilowatts of electricity. But by the year 2002, as I said, the Bush Administration unilaterally abrogated that agreement without giving prior notice to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. So far, the United States has not paid a single penny to compensate for the loss it caused the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We have computed already how much compensation the United States should pay for that; everybody can imagine how much that should be.

Thirdly, there is mention of the threat of nuclear tests to international peace and security. Again, that is not the case and goes against the fundamental reality. As I said, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States made an agreement and adopted it in 1994. That was the first-ever agreed framework between the two sides, the first-ever historical agreement. Under that agreement, there is one component that stipulates that the United States is committed not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten the security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But that was not the case with the United States. In 2002, the United States listed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea along with Iran and Iraq as the axis of evil. First, Iraq was mercilessly attacked with armed invasion by the United States, and everybody knows what has happened so far. One month after the end of the Iraq war, the Bush Administration openly said that the next target would be the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not Iraq.

So those are the threats that have been caused so far by the United States. More than ever before, we are under increasing nuclear threat from nuclear-powered submarines carrying nuclear weapons and from nuclear-powered aircraft carriers carrying massive amounts of weapons of destruction and different types of sophisticated weaponry that daily enter the Korean peninsula, South Korea and its vicinity. This is the threat, with a military alliance, that is growing increasingly stronger, with a negative impact on the Korean peninsula, the region and the world as a whole.

Concerning the demarche by the Director General of the IAEA, he referred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea once again and urged it to implement the Security Council resolutions against it. Those Security Council resolutions — two resolutions — were totally and categorically rejected by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as each of them was adopted, as being of no help at all to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, and actually undermining peace and security there, because they do not reflect fundamental realities.

The United States has been a perpetrator in terms of the nuclear threat to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 1957. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been under that nuclear threat — a victim. But the Security Council resolutions view this in a different way, as if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were an offender, a perpetrator of the nuclear threat against world peace and security. I would like to remind the Director General of the fundamental reality of what is happening and of what has occurred in the past.

In conclusion, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea delegation would like to clarify its position on the settlement of the nuclear issue. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea firmly believes that military exercises and military alliances are not an option or a solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains committed to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through the Six-Party Talks, at the earliest possible date, without any preconditions and in the context of the full implementation of the 19 September joint statement, in a comprehensive and balanced manner based on the principle of simultaneous action.

That is what our great leader, the respected Kim Jong Il, underlined in his recent interview with ITAR-TASS.

The Acting President: The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/66/L.6. May I take it that the Assembly decides to adopt draft resolution A/66/L.6?

Draft resolution A/66/L.6 was adopted (resolution 66/7).

The Acting President: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

May I remind members that statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second intervention and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Ri Tong Il (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Thank you, Madam President, for giving me the floor once again.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea categorically rejects the remarks made by the representatives of Japan and South Korea, because they have no fundamental reality or truth as concerns the Korean peninsula, as I said earlier.

I should like to draw the attention of the representatives participating in this meeting to one issue: South Korea is under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, as I mentioned earlier. It has been living under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the largest nuclear-weapon State. With respect to South Korea, the first thing we want to know is why it allowed a foreign Power, the largest nuclear-weapon Power, to bring this to our land — in a move that is disastrous to our national survival, our national dignity and our national sovereignty. That is the first question that the nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have in their hearts. I think that most of the participants in this meeting will share this view.

As far as United States nuclear weapons in South Korea, in 1975 a shocking and surprising media report came out. A parliamentary debate was ongoing in the United States on the military budget of that country for 1976, and it was only then that the fact that nuclear weapons had been deployed to South Korea was revealed. It was only then that South Korean authorities learned that there were nuclear weapons in South Korea. No South Korean authorities or politicians were aware of that fact.

There is another factor to which the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to draw attention: the military alliance. As I said before, this is a very serious concern for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the countries in the North-East Asian region and in our Asia-Pacific region.

The military exercises, in scope and in nature, are giving rise to increasingly grave concerns. Even as we speak, the United States and South Korea are conducting joint military exercises in South Korea. They began on 27 October and continue through tomorrow. How many people are participating? How many troops? A total of 140,000 troops are participating. The Western media are not reporting this news. This is causing great concern, as it is taking place while a dialogue is ongoing. The South Korean authorities are carrying out this kind of military provocation even as dialogue is being conducted. As members are aware, just last week there was a dialogue.

Yet the South Korean representative, at this meeting, took a confrontational approach in his remarks, failing to mention a single word about dialogue towards the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to urge the representative and the authorities of South Korea to remove the United States military bases from South Korea; they have been there for more than six decades, since 1945, dividing the country and creating a disastrous risk for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its South Korean brothers and the entire Korean nation. We urge South Korea to remove the military bases of the United States, which are a haven for United States nuclear weapons.

As for Japan, the same applies. It is also under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Furthermore, in 1960 the Japanese Government made a secret deal with the United States to allow American warships carrying nuclear weapons to enter the territorial waters of Japan. Since that time, it is everyday business for United States naval forces carrying nuclear weapons. It is up to them when they come and go, without providing any information at all. Furthermore, Japan is the largest weapons-grade plutonium accumulator in the world, to the tune of more than 40 tons, and it has the technology for nuclear weapons. It can assemble a nuclear weapon at short notice — within one week. This is known to every expert and every population in this world. It is an open secret.

Concerning means of delivery, it is also an open secret that the Japanese Government did not hesitate to engage in joint research and development in the area of missile defence with the United States, which it has been doing since 1999. Now it is reaching the stage of practical deployment in strategic positions, affecting the peace and stability of North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific regions and the entire world.

Mr. Rim Kap-soo (Republic of Korea): I would like to exercise the Republic of Korea's right of reply in response to the North Korean delegation's claims, which clearly run counter to facts that have been recognized and supported by the international community.

Let me briefly chronicle what has happened since the year 1993. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1993 and again in 2003. In 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported the Democratic People's Republic's non-compliance with the safeguards agreement to the Security Council. The Democratic People's Republic conducted nuclear tests in 2006, just a year after the adoption of the 2005 Joint Statement. In April 2009, the Democratic People's Republic kicked the IAEA inspectors out of their country and, in May of the same year, they again conducted nuclear tests. Last year, they disclosed another nuclear programme for uranium enrichment.

The Security Council has adopted three resolutions, five presidential statements and one press statement on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear issue. Council resolution 825 (1993) was adopted in 1993 when the Democratic People's Republic announced its unilateral withdrawal. Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) were adopted right after the Democratic People's Republic conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, respectively. In resolution 1874 (2009), the Security Council stated that it "[c]ondemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test" and decided that the Democratic People's Republic should abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. Further, the Security Council called upon the Democratic People's Republic to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

Not only did the Security Council act, but the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Parties clearly stated that the Democratic People's Republic undertook to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed that fact and requested the Democratic People's Republic to return to the NPT and to compliance with the IAEA safeguards. Numerous violations detected by IAEA also confirm that fact, and further, the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, signed on 31 December 1991, clearly stipulated that North Korea should not produce uranium enrichment facilities.

The North Korean delegation is blatantly ignoring all of those obligations and now claims the right of peaceful use. With that right, the international community, including the United Nations and the IAEA, would, in their view, be ganging up in a grand conspiracy against the innocent North Korean authorities, but the North Korean authorities continue to confront and violate its international obligations. I believe that the North Korean position defies common sense.

Secondly, regarding national security, there have been a great many unprovoked provocations by North Korea. Of such provocations, I will give but some examples of those that were brought to and discussed at the United Nations. In 1983, bombs exploded and killed 17 high-level officials of the Republic of Korea, including our then-Foreign Minister, who were accompanying our President to Myanmar on a State visit. In 1987, a civilian Korea Air Lines flight exploded mid-air on the way home from abroad; all of the 115 people aboard were killed. In 1996, a North Korea submarine infiltrated our coastline with heavily armed military personnel, which led to a Security Council presidential statement (S/PRST/1996/42).

I will not elaborate any further on what happened last year — the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong shelling, which killed 50 people. Just last year, by my rough count, over 200 Korean people were killed or injured. Beside those physical provocations, the Democratic People's Republic has also mounted a great many verbal provocations. In 1994, a senior official of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made the threatening remark that "Seoul is not far from the border. If war breaks out, Seoul will fall into the sea of fire". Those same remarks were repeated last year by a senior military general of the North Korean regime. Last December, North Korea's top military general declared that nuclear war is nearing and that all of South Korea will be engulfed in nuclear fire.

Now, my question is, once again, who is threatening? Who is living under a constant threat? Is it the North or the South? I will leave the answer to this question to the Assembly's common sense.

Lastly, after the signing of the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula in 1992, there has not been a single piece of news about any situation in that connection in South Korea. That is also a fact.

Mr. Kodama (Japan): I would like to exercise the right of reply to the allegations against Japan made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at this meeting. Let me set the record straight on the following three points.

First of all, the Japanese Government's adherence to the three non-nuclear principles, namely that possessing, manufacturing or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the territory of Japan is prohibited, remains unchanged. Japan's determination to bring about the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a view to achieving a world without nuclear weapons is unshakeable. In that regard, indeed, there exist no facts supporting any claim that the Government of Japan has ever allowed the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States on Japanese territories. Based on the United States nuclear policy expressed to date, such as the announcement in 1991, it is the judgment of the Government of Japan that there has currently been no introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States, including vessels and/or aircraft, to call at ports in, land on or transit through Japanese territories.

Secondly, Japan has strictly complied with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a State party to the NPT. The peaceful nature of Japan's use of nuclear energy has been confirmed by the IAEA in its annual conclusion that all nuclear material remains within peaceful activities. Moreover, beyond its legal obligations, Japan has, as an international transparency measure, regularly reported the amount of its plutonium holdings in accordance with the guidelines for the management of plutonium, most recently on 29 September 2011.

Thirdly and finally, Japan maintains an exclusively defence-oriented policy. Therefore, exercises conducted by the Self-Defence Forces of Japan do not target any particular country or area. Moreover, the ballistic missile defence system which Japan has decided to introduce is purely defensive in nature and does not threaten any country or area neighbouring Japan.

The Acting President: I remind members that statements made in exercise of right of reply are limited to five minutes for the second intervention.

Mr. Ri Tong Il (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Concerning the remarks by the representatives of the Republic of Korea and Japan, these representatives again made remarks that do not convey the fundamental realities on the Korean peninsula and in the vicinity, specifically in Japan. The representative of South Korea tells a different story by not referring to the nuclear umbrella that it has been using for over six decades, the world's largest nuclear-weapon nuclear umbrella. This is of the greatest concern to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. In the entire region there is not a single nuclear weapon threatening the sovereignty, dignity or national survival of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The only threat is the United States' nuclear umbrella, and South Korea is using that umbrella, though the representative did not refer to it.

Secondly, concerning the Security Council resolutions, as I said earlier, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea totally rejects them as reflecting no fundamental reality on the Korean peninsula. That fact undermines the mandate of the Security Council and the credibility of the United Nations Charter, which stipulates that every country has a sovereign right to defend itself. Self-defence is indeed at stake in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which exists under South Korea's nuclear umbrella provided by the largest nuclear-weapon State.

Thirdly, concerning the so-called — according to what was said here earlier — terrorist attacks by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it was the dictatorial regime of South Korea that was responsible. Every time there was a political crisis at that time the South Korean authorities made up a story, diverting the attention of the people of South Korea to accusations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, so that the authorities could survive the political crisis.

It is the same with the current South Korean authorities. In the case of last year's Cheonan incident, as soon as they came to power the South Korean authorities stopped all the channels of reconciliation dialogue between the two sides, which were in place under and in line with the Joint Declaration of 15 June 2000, adopted at the summit meeting in Pyongyang,

which was followed by another summit meeting in 2007. But the South Korean authorities stopped that entire process, and now they are in a political crisis. So they fabricated the so-called Cheonan incident. And how many young soldiers did they kill? It was over 40. There is much profound scepticism about that incident, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea strongly insists that the ones responsible for that incident should be brought to justice. There is much scepticism about that incident. The so-called assessment survey results are less than convincing. There are many questions, even among the South Korean population. Experts living in the United States have themselves openly released their own arguments against the survey results.

In response to the delegate of Japan, Japan has once again made false remarks under the guise of so-called three non-nuclear principles. But fortunately, last year the Foreign Minister of Japan acknowledged the proven entry of United States nuclear weapons into the territorial waters of Japan, on the adoption of the secret nuclear deal in 1960. They never asked what was coming into their territorial waters. Also, Japan is now making a lot of territorial plans — on the Korean peninsula in Dokdo Island, on Chinese territory in the Diaoyu Islands and on Russian territory in the Kuril Islands. And one country is encouraging Japan to continue pressing those claims — and that is the United States.

Mr. Rim Kap-soo (Republic of Korea): Regarding the claims made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I will be very brief. First, Seoul is just 55 miles away from the border and has a population of 12 million people. Along the border there are 1 million North Korean troops. They have made a great many provocations, as I indicated earlier. Without going into detail, there are over 24 cases. So we are constantly being threatened by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I live in Seoul, so I know very well how difficult and dangerous it is to live in such a situation. So, if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea claims that they are facing a nuclear threat from the United States, Seoul is just 55 miles away from the hostile nuclear arms of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Secondly, last year our ship Cheonan was sunk, and 46 young soldiers died. Also, in November one of our islands was very heavily shelled, killing four people. There was no response to our complaints from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They did not acknowledge or even refute any wrongdoing. But then, who did it? Did the "Phantom of the Opera" do it?

Thirdly, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea mentioned our dictatorial regime in 1980 inventing fabrications. Allow me to advise his delegation that the dictatorial regime in the North should take care of its own people before making such allegations.

Mr. Kodama (Japan): I will be very brief. Whatever allegations the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made in his second exercise of the right of reply, my delegation would like very much to remind the international community that it was the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that continued developing its nuclear and missile programmes, including its uranium enrichment programme, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 coming out of the Six-Party Talks.

It is imperative for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete steps to demonstrate its genuine commitment to complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization and to improving inter-Korean relations, in order to have meaningful dialogue among the six parties.

The Acting President: May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 86?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.